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A commonsense assessment of Arrow's theorem

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  • Ortona, Guido

Abstract

The usual, pessimistic interpretation of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem ("Impossibility" in textbooks) stems from a refusal to accept social indifference between alternatives. If social indifference is absent the Condorcet rule satisfies the axioms of the theorem. It is also argued that social indifference is rare, and that it is easy to find a second-round rule to be employed if it occurs, with no effects on the use of the Condorcet rule in the first round.

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  • Ortona, Guido, 2015. "A commonsense assessment of Arrow's theorem," POLIS Working Papers 182, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    • Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:182
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    1. Bissey, Marie-Edith & Ortona, Guido, 2007. "The program for the simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: what it does and how to use it," POLIS Working Papers 82, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General

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