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Kontrollrechte und Anreize in Supply Chains

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Hofmann

    (Universität Mannheim)

  • Erik Hofmann

    (Universität St. Gallen)

  • Thomas Pfeiffer

    (Universität Wien)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Hofmann & Erik Hofmann & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2008. "Kontrollrechte und Anreize in Supply Chains," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 60(59), pages 1-29, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:60:y:2008:i:59:d:10.1007_bf03372971
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372971
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lee, Ching Chyi & Chu, Wai Hung Julius, 2005. "Who should control inventory in a supply chain?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(1), pages 158-172, July.
    2. Mark Young, S. & Shields, Michael D. & Wolf, Gerrit, 1988. "Manufacturing controls and performance: An experiment," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 607-618, October.
    3. Demski, Js & Sappington, Dem, 1993. "Sourcing With Unverifiable Performance Information," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 1-20.
    4. Thomas Pfeiffer, 2004. "The Value of Information in the Hold‐Up Problem," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 177-203, May.
    5. Sabine Böckem & Ulf Schiller, 2008. "Option Contracts in Supply Chains," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 219-245, March.
    6. Narasimhan, Ram & Nair, Anand, 2005. "The antecedent role of quality, information sharing and supply chain proximity on strategic alliance formation and performance," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 301-313, June.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    8. Terry A. Taylor & Erica L. Plambeck, 2007. "Supply Chain Relationships and Contracts: The Impact of Repeated Interaction on Capacity Investment and Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(10), pages 1577-1593, October.
    9. Cremer, Jacques, 1995. "Towards an economic theory of incentives in just-in-time manufacturing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 432-439, April.
    10. Kumar, U. Dinesh & Nowicki, David & Ramirez-Marquez, Jose Emmanuel & Verma, Dinesh, 2008. "On the optimal selection of process alternatives in a Six Sigma implementation," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 456-467, February.
    11. William H. Ross & Jeng-Chung Victor Chen & Shaoyu F. Huang, 2007. "Adapting different media types to trust development in the supply chain," International Journal of Management and Enterprise Development, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 4(4), pages 373-386.
    12. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
    13. Georgia Perakis & Guillaume Roels, 2007. "The Price of Anarchy in Supply Chains: Quantifying the Efficiency of Price-Only Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(8), pages 1249-1268, August.
    14. John Christensen, 1981. "Communication in Agencies," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 661-674, Autumn.
    15. Christian Hofmann, 2005. "Gestaltung von Erfolgsrechnungen zur Steuerung langfristiger Projekte," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 57(8), pages 689-716, December.
    16. Pfeiffer Thomas, 2004. "The Value of Information in the Hold-Up Problem," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 177-203, May.
    17. Gérard P. Cachon & Martin A. Lariviere, 2005. "Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(1), pages 30-44, January.
    18. Stanley Baiman & Paul E. Fischer & Madhav V. Rajan, 2001. "Performance Measurement and Design in Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 173-188, January.
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