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Garantien als Signale für die Produktqualität?

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  • Martin Nell

    (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)

Abstract

Summary This paper deals with the question, whether warranties can be used to signal the (unobservable) quality of a product to the consumers. Although this question is usually answered in the positive in the literature, it is shown that the superficial plausibility of the mainstream signalling hypothesis can not be confirmed once we apply a thorough formal analYSis. This result which is derived by game theoretic analysis has practical implications for firm's marketing activities as well as for the design of warranties implied by law. Furthermore the results show that signalling arguments should be used with much more caution. This is presumably true not only for warranties but for other areas of research too.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Nell, 1999. "Garantien als Signale für die Produktqualität?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 51(10), pages 937-962, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:51:y:1999:i:10:d:10.1007_bf03371605
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371605
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
    2. Esther Gal-Or, 1989. "Warranties as a Signal of Quality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 50-61, February.
    3. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication," Working papers 386, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    4. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    6. Kaas, Klaus Peter, 1982. "Consumer habit forming, information acquisition, and buying behavior," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 3-15, March.
    7. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    8. Wiener, Joshua Lyle, 1985. "Are Warranties Accurate Signals of Product Reliability?," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 12(2), pages 245-250, September.
    9. Nancy A. Lutz, 1989. "Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 239-255, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Heidrun Jander & Robert Kahlenberg & Jürgen Graßhoff, 2006. "Gewährleistungsmanagement im Entstehungszyklus eines Fahrzeugs: Weiterentwicklung des Target Costing-Konzeptes bei BMW Motorrad," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 128-148, February.

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