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IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics

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  • Wolfgang Mayer
  • Alex Mourmouras

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  • Wolfgang Mayer & Alex Mourmouras, 2008. "IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 105-121, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:2:p:105-121
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-007-9023-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mr. Wolfgang Mayer & Mr. Alex Mourmouras, 2004. "The Political Economy of Conditional and Unconditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers," IMF Working Papers 2004/038, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Alberto Paloni & Maurizio Zanardi, 2006. "Development Policy Lending, Conditionality, and Ownership: A Dynamic Agency Model Perspective," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 253-266, May.
    3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31.
    4. Carsten Hefeker & Katharina Michaelowa, 2005. "Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 159-175, January.
    5. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    6. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-769, August.
    7. Wolfgang Mayer, 2004. "The Political Economy of Unconditional and Conditional Foreign Assistance: Grants vs. Loan Rollovers," University of Cincinnati, Economics Working Papers Series 2004-02, University of Cincinnati, Department of Economics.
    8. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March.
    9. Michael Mussa & Miguel Savastano, 2000. "The IMF Approach to Economic Stabilization," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1999, Volume 14, pages 79-128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Mr. Wolfgang Mayer & Mr. Alex Mourmouras, 2005. "On the Viability of Conditional Assistance Programs," IMF Working Papers 2005/121, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Mr. Alex Mourmouras & Mr. Wolfgang Mayer, 2002. "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 2002/073, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    13. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-278, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura & Dreher, Axel, 2011. "Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 86-98, May.
    2. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence," KOF Working papers 09-218, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    3. Wade Jacoby & Gabriel Lataianu & Camelia Lataianu, 2009. "Success in slow motion: The Europeanization of Romanian child protection policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 111-133, June.
    4. Ozlem Arpac & Graham Bird, 2009. "Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-157, June.
    5. Silva Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence," Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 183, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    7. Bernhard Reinsberg & Thomas Stubbs & Alexander Kentikelenis, 2022. "Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1022-1041, October.
    8. Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati & Samuel Brazys, 2023. "Does cultural diversity hinder the implementation of IMF-supported programs? An empirical investigation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 87-116, January.
    9. Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen, 2010. "The effects of IMF programs on U.S. foreign direct investment in the developing world," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 73-95, March.
    10. Kym Anderson & Gordon Rausser & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 423-477, June.
    11. Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen, 2011. "How soon is now? The effects of the IMF on economic reforms in Latin America," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 189-213, July.
    12. repec:elg:eechap:15325_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Hassan Naqvi, 2014. "IMF Conditionality and the Intertemporal Allocation of Resources," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 14(2), pages 203-235, June.
    14. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
    15. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
    16. Nikitas Konstantinidis & Yannis Karagiannis, 2020. "Intrinsic vs. extrinsic incentives for reform: An informational mechanism of E(M)U conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 601-632, July.
    17. repec:got:cegedp:86 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Hagen, Rune Jansen, 2014. "Rents and the Political Economy of Development Aid," Working Papers in Economics 07/14, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    19. Laura Sabani, 2019. "The IMF and the World Bank: The Role of Competition and Domain Dissent in Communication and Decision Making," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 48(1), February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Special interest politics; Political economy; Policy reforms; Models of the IMF; Conditionality; E61; F33; F34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

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