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The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness

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  • Yuta Nakamura

    (Yokohama City University)

Abstract

Moulin (J Public Econ 31:53–78, 1986; Theorem 4) characterizes the pivotal mechanisms without imposing strategy-proofness under the assumption of the full domain. In this paper, we provide a domain property that is necessary and sufficient for Moulin’s characterization without strategy-proofness to hold. We also provide examples of domains that do (not) satisfy our domain property.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuta Nakamura, 2020. "The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(3), pages 171-186, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:24:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s10058-020-00236-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00236-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Birgit Heydenreich & Rudolf Müller & Marc Uetz & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2009. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 307-316, January.
    2. Carbajal, Juan Carlos, 2010. "On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 763-772, March.
    3. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    4. Nakamura, Yuta, 2019. "Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 77-87.
    5. Jeroen Suijs, 1996. "On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 193-209, December.
    6. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    7. Moulin, H., 1986. "Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 53-78, October.
    8. , & ,, 2007. "A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pivotal mechanism; Domain restriction; No free ride; No disposal of utility; Distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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