Rawlsian Allocation In Queueing And Sequencing Problem
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Cited by:
- Aloysius Ajab AMIN, 2015. "An incentive compatible model for eliciting firms’ production function in a development process," Journal of Economics Library, KSP Journals, vol. 2(2), pages 93-101, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
Queueing problems; Sequencing problems; Strategyproofness; Rawlsian allocation.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2014-11-12 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2014-11-12 (Game Theory)
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