Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0183-8
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Cited by:
- Ziyi Tan & Shulin Liu, 2022. "The Generalized First- and Second-Price Auctions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Price," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-15, January.
- Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 85-91.
- Zeynep Kantur & Kerim Keskin, 2019. "On (mis-)perception of probabilities in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 726-733.
- Zachary Breig & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Declan Hunt, 2022. "Experimental Auctions with Securities," Discussion Papers Series 657, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
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More about this item
Keywords
First-price auctions; Overbidding; Subjective probability weighting; Inverse S-shaped functions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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