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Analytical solution of kth price auction

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Mihelich

    (Open Pricer
    École normale supérieure)

  • Yan Shu

    (Walnut Algorithms)

Abstract

We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for the kth price auction by using inverse of distribution functions. As applications, we identify the unique symmetric equilibrium where the valuations have polynomial distribution, fat tail distribution and exponential distributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Mihelich & Yan Shu, 2020. "Analytical solution of kth price auction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 875-884, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00729-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00729-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Maskin, 2004. "The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass," Economics Working Papers 0044, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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