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Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game

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  • David Malueg

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  • David Malueg, 2010. "Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 243-270, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:44:y:2010:i:2:p:243-270
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0478-5
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    3. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer.
    4. Michael R. Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper G. Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 209-223, Springer.
    5. Jack Robles, 2008. "Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(1), pages 19-36, April.
    6. Khan, M. Ali & Yeneng, Sun, 1995. "Pure strategies in games with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 633-653.
    7. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    8. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
    9. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1993. "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Papers 10-93-9, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    10. Tore Ellingsen & Topi Miettinen, 2008. "Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1629-1635, September.
    11. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    12. Haifeng Fu, 2008. "Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong purification for games with private and public information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 521-532, December.
    13. Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    14. Nejat Anbarci, 2001. "Divide-the-Dollar Game Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 295-303, June.
    15. Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-1496, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Esat Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu, 2014. "Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 223-236, August.
    2. Baughman, Garth & Rabinovich, Stanislav, 2019. "Self-confirming price dispersion in monetary economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 284-311.
    3. Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Justin Leroux & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2011. "Splitting an Uncertain (Natural) Capital," Cahiers de recherche 11-01, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
    4. Van Essen, Matthew, 2014. "A Simple Bargaining Model where Parties Make Errors," MPRA Paper 58952, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Bochet, Olivier & Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy & Leroux, Justin & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2019. "Collective risk-taking in the commons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 277-296.
    6. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Reasonable Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 319-330, September.
    7. Duman, Papatya & Trockel, Walter, 2020. "Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: $H_{\alpha}$ -Essential Equilibria," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 632, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    8. Nejat Anbarci & Kang Rong & Jaideep Roy, 2019. "Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 21-52, July.
    9. Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel, 2020. "Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: Ha-Essential Equilibria," Working Papers CIE 130, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    10. Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 1-5.
    11. Tarbush, Bassel, 2018. "Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 222-240.
    12. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2020. "Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 639-650, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash Demand Game; Divide-the-Dollar Game; Mixed-strategy equilibria; C72; C78;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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