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On random stable partitions

Author

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  • Boris Pittel

    (The Ohio State University)

Abstract

It is well known that the one-sided stable matching problem (“stable roommates problem”) does not necessarily have a solution. We had found that, for the independent, uniformly random preference lists, the expected number of solutions converges to $$e^{1/2}$$ e 1 / 2 as n, the number of members, grows, and with Rob Irving we proved that the limiting probability of solvability is below $$e^{1/2}/2$$ e 1 / 2 / 2 , at most. Stephan Mertens’s extensive numerics compelled him to conjecture that this probability is of order $$n^{-1/4}$$ n - 1 / 4 . Jimmy Tan introduced a notion of a stable cyclic partition, and proved existence of such a partition for every system of members’ preferences, discovering that presence of odd cycles in a stable partition is equivalent to absence of a stable matching. In this paper we show that the expected number of stable partitions with odd cycles grows as $$n^{1/4}$$ n 1 / 4 . However the standard deviation of that number is of order $$n^{3/8}\gg n^{1/4}$$ n 3 / 8 ≫ n 1 / 4 , i.e. too large to conclude that the odd cycles exist with probability $$1-o(1)$$ 1 - o ( 1 ) . Still, as a byproduct, we show that with probability $$1-o(1)$$ 1 - o ( 1 ) the fraction of members with more than one stable “predecessor” is of order $$n^{-1/2+o(1)}$$ n - 1 / 2 + o ( 1 ) . Furthermore, with probability $$1-o(1)$$ 1 - o ( 1 ) the average rank of a predecessor in every stable partition is of order $$n^{1/2}$$ n 1 / 2 . The likely size of the largest stable matching is $$n/2-O(n^{1/4+o(1)})$$ n / 2 - O ( n 1 / 4 + o ( 1 ) ) , and the likely number of pairs of unmatched members blocking the optimal complete matching is $$O(n^{3/4+o(1)})$$ O ( n 3 / 4 + o ( 1 ) ) .

Suggested Citation

  • Boris Pittel, 2019. "On random stable partitions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 433-480, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:48:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0635-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0635-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    2. José Alcalde, 1994. "Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 275-287, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Mauras, 2020. "Two-Sided Random Matching Markets: Ex-Ante Equivalence of the Deferred Acceptance Procedures," Papers 2005.08584, arXiv.org.
    2. Andrew J. Collins & Sheida Etemadidavan & Wael Khallouli, 2020. "Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games using a Monte Carlo Method," Papers 2007.12127, arXiv.org.
    3. Piazza, Adriana & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2024. "Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 321-339.
    4. Braitt, Milton dos Santos & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo, 2021. "Matching with externalities: The role of prudence and social connectedness in stability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 95-102.

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