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Almost common priors

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  • Ziv Hellman

Abstract

What happens when priors are not common? We introduce a measure for how far a type space is from having a common prior, which we term prior distance. If a type space has δ prior distance, then for any bet f it cannot be common knowledge that each player expects a positive gain of δ times the sup-norm of f, thus extending no betting results under common priors. Furthermore, as more information is obtained and partitions are refined, the prior distance, and thus the extent of common knowledge disagreement, can only decrease. We derive an upper bound on the number of refinements needed to arrive at a situation in which the knowledge space has a common prior, which depends only on the number of initial partition elements. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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  • Ziv Hellman, 2013. "Almost common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 399-410, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:399-410
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0347-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hellman, Ziv & Samet, Dov, 2012. "How common are common priors?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 517-525.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian W. Bach & Jérémie Cabessa, 2023. "Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium," Post-Print hal-04271274, HAL.
    2. Ziv Hellman & Miklós Pintér, 2022. "Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 567-587, November.
    3. Leandro Nascimento, 2022. "Bounded arbitrage and nearly rational behavior," Papers 2212.02680, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    4. Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2013. "Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 129-133.
    5. Ziv Hellman & Miklós Pintér, 2020. "Charges and Bets: A General Characterisation of Common Priors," Working Papers 2020-06, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    6. Bach, Christian W. & Cabessa, Jérémie, 2023. "Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    7. Gizatulina, Alia & Hellman, Ziv, 2019. "No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 161-184.

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