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Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem

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  • Steve Alpern
  • Shmuel Gal

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  • Steve Alpern & Shmuel Gal, 2009. "Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 377-394, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:3:p:377-394
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0159-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alpern, Steve & Gal, Shmuel & Solan, Eilon, 2010. "A sequential selection game with vetoes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-14, January.
    2. Morris H. Degroot & Joseph B. Kadane, 1980. "Optimal Challenges for Selection," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(4), pages 952-968, August.
    3. Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, 1978. "Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(6), pages 966-991, December.
    4. Dutta, Prajit K & Sundaram, Rangarajan, 1992. "Markovian Equilibrium in a Class of Stochastic Games: Existence Theorems for Discounted and Undiscounted Models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 197-214, April.
    5. Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan, 2002. "Two Player Non Zero-Sum Stopping Games in Discrete Time," Discussion Papers 1347, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    6. Arthur Roth & Joseph B. Kadane & Morris H. Degroot, 1977. "Optimal Peremptory Challenges in Trials by Juries: A Bilateral Sequential Process," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 901-919, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Rohan DUTTA, 2016. "Joint Search with No Information: An Inefficient Immediate Agreement Theorem," Cahiers de recherche 12-2016, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    2. Werner Guth & Torsten Weiland, 2011. "Aspiration formation and satisficing in search with(out) competition," New Zealand Economic Papers, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(1-2), pages 23-45.
    3. Francis X. Flanagan, 2015. "Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 385-416.
    4. Longjian Li & Alexis Akira Toda, 2022. "Incentivizing Hidden Types in Secretary Problem," Papers 2208.05897, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    5. Steve Alpern & Vic Baston, 2017. "The Secretary Problem with a Selection Committee: Do Conformist Committees Hire Better Secretaries?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1184-1197, April.
    6. Dutta, Rohan, 2017. "Joint search with no information: An immediate agreement theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 43-45.
    7. , & ,, 2013. "Specialization and partisanship in committee search," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.

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