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Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges

Author

Listed:
  • Steven J. Brams

    (New York University, New York, New York)

  • Morton D. Davis

    (City College of New York, New York, New York)

Abstract

Potential jurors with a priori probabilities of voting for conviction are assumed to be chosen randomly from a population and to come up one at a time for decision. Defense and prosecution must decide whether to accept or challenge a potential juror as a function of his a priori probability, the distribution of these probabilities in the population, the number of jurors remaining to be selected, and the number of peremptory challenges both sides have remaining. We find a recursive algorithm that minimizes for the defense, and maximizes for the prosecution, the expected probability of conviction in the jury-selection game. A number of conclusions are drawn from numerical calculations of optimal strategies and values in this game, and the analysis is extended to cover the case of peremptory challenges to groups of potential jurors.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams & Morton D. Davis, 1978. "Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(6), pages 966-991, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:26:y:1978:i:6:p:966-991
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.26.6.966
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    Cited by:

    1. Alfredo Di Tillio & Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2021. "Strategic Sample Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 911-953, March.
    2. Steve Alpern & Shmuel Gal, 2009. "Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 377-394, November.
    3. Alpern, Steve & Gal, Shmuel & Solan, Eilon, 2010. "A sequential selection game with vetoes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-14, January.
    4. Casella, Alessandra & Gelman, Andrew & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2006. "An experimental study of storable votes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 123-154, October.
    5. Lehmann, Jee-Yeon & Smith, Jeremy, 2011. "Attorney empowerment in Voir Dire and the racial composition of juries," MPRA Paper 36338, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Joseph Kadane & Christopher Stone & Garrick Wallstrom, 1999. "The Donation Paradox for Peremptory Challenges," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 139-155, October.
    7. Moro, Andrea & Van der Linden, Martin, 2021. "Exclusion of Extreme Jurors and Minority Representation: The Effect of Jury Selection Procedures," MPRA Paper 106087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Steve Alpern & Bo Chen, 2017. "Who should cast the casting vote? Using sequential voting to amalgamate information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(2), pages 259-282, August.
    9. Francis X. Flanagan, 2015. "Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 385-416.
    10. Steven J. Brams & Todd R. Kaplan, 2004. "Dividing the Indivisible," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(2), pages 143-173, April.

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