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The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games

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  • M. Khan
  • Kali Rath
  • Yeneng Sun

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  • M. Khan & Kali Rath & Yeneng Sun, 2006. "The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 91-104, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:91-104
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0004-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 2002. "Non-cooperative games with many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 1761-1808, Elsevier.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
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