The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control
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- Martin Gregor & Dalibor Roháč, 2009. "The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control," Working Papers IES 2009/14, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Mar 2009.
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More about this item
Keywords
State aid; signaling; career concerns; aid control;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
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