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A randomized tabu search-based approach for perfect stranger matching in economic experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Both, F.
  • Adam, M.T.P.
  • Hariharan, A.
  • Dorner, V.
  • Lux, E.
  • Weinhardt, C.

Abstract

Experiments in the field of behavioral economics often require repeated matching of participants to groups over multiple periods. Perfect stranger matching requires that no two participants interact more than once during the experiment. Computing a sequence of perfect stranger matches is an NP-hard problem that has received little attention in experimental economics literature beyond brute-force approaches. This work provides a problem definition and an algorithm for perfect stranger matching that outperforms existing approaches in the field of experimental economics in terms of problem size and number of found matches.

Suggested Citation

  • Both, F. & Adam, M.T.P. & Hariharan, A. & Dorner, V. & Lux, E. & Weinhardt, C., 2016. "A randomized tabu search-based approach for perfect stranger matching in economic experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 235-238.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:235-238
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.06.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Maximilian Andres, 2024. "Equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games with communication," CEPA Discussion Papers 75, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Perfect stranger matching; Experimental economics; Permutation problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments

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