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Informality and access to finance during socialism and transition – the case of the rotating savings and credit schemes

Author

Listed:
  • Drini Imami

    (Agricultural University of Tirana
    Centre for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute (CERGE-EI)
    Faculty of Tropical Agri Sciences Czech University of Life Sciences)

  • Klodjan Rama

    (Agricultural University of Tirana)

  • Abel Polese

    (Dublin City University
    University of Latvia
    Tallinn University)

Abstract

Although access to finance has grown rapidly all over the world, largely based on the expansion of the banking sector, informal finance is still common. Rotating savings and credit schemes have been diffused in many countries across the world, including socialist countries, generally stimulated by a lack of access to loans. These schemes are informal (with no formal binding obligations or written rules) and voluntary, and their functioning depends on successful collective action. Although free-riding and other collective action problems would be expected, such cases have been rarely reported. Based on a set of in-depth interviews targeting individuals who were involved in such schemes in four different post-socialist countries, this paper shows an explanation to the question why free-riding was not the dominant strategy. The paper argues that the reputation and other social capital-components coupled with pressuring instruments used for enforcement of socialist ideology have been the key mechanisms that enabled the functioning of the rotating savings and credit schemes. The importance of trust and reputation received a high value in the selection of the schemes’ coordinator, group members and size. These enabled the successful implementation of the rotating savings and credit schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • Drini Imami & Klodjan Rama & Abel Polese, 2020. "Informality and access to finance during socialism and transition – the case of the rotating savings and credit schemes," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 30(5), pages 1367-1383, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:30:y:2020:i:5:d:10.1007_s00191-020-00679-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-020-00679-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tsai, Kellee S., 2004. "Imperfect Substitutes: The Local Political Economy of Informal Finance and Microfinance in Rural China and India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1487-1507, September.
    2. Barbara Casu & Andrew Gall, 2016. "Building Societies in the Financial Services Industry," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-60208-4, December.
    3. Scholten, Ulrich, 2000. "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Developed Countries: The German-Austrian Bausparkassen," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 340-363, June.
    4. Tridico, Pasquale, 2013. "The stage of development among former communist economies: Social capital, the middle class and democracy," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 47-58.
    5. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Polese, Abel, 2022. "The ubiquity of Japanese informality and Okinawan Moai (模合)," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 23(3), pages 31-37.
    2. Engjell Skreli & Orjon Xhoxhi & Drini Imami & Klodjan Rama, 2024. "What explains collective action: The impact of social capital, incentive structures and economic benefits," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(3), pages 1622-1646, April.
    3. Imami, Drini & Valentinov, Vladislav & Skreli, Engjell, 2021. "Food safety and value chain coordination in the context of a transition economy: The role of agricultural cooperatives," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 15(1), pages 21-34.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Informality; Rotating savings and credit schemes; Trust; Socialism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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