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Cooperation in the sporadically repeated prisoners’ dilemma via reputation mechanisms

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  • Dale Stahl

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  • Dale Stahl, 2011. "Cooperation in the sporadically repeated prisoners’ dilemma via reputation mechanisms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 687-702, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:21:y:2011:i:4:p:687-702
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-010-0204-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    3. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
    4. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2004. "What can we learn from cultural group selection and co-evolutionary models?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 105-108, January.
    5. Crow, James F., 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation, by J. Henrich," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-56, January.
    6. Aoki, Kenichi, 2004. "Altruism may be sexy: Comment on cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 37-40, January.
    7. Aruka, Yuji, 2004. "How to measure social interactions via group selection?: Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes, and large-scale cooperation: a comment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 41-47, January.
    8. Norgaard, Richard B., 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes, and large-scale cooperation: a comment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 93-95, January.
    9. Possajennikov, Alex, 2004. "Comment on "cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation" by Joseph Henrich," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 97-100, January.
    10. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
    11. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1985. "Two-Tier Pricing of Shared Facilities in a Free-Entry Equilibrium," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 456-472, Winter.
    12. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weijun Zeng & Minqiang Li & Nan Feng, 2017. "The effects of heterogeneous interaction and risk attitude adaptation on the evolution of cooperation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 435-459, July.
    2. Romero, Julian & Rosokha, Yaroslav, 2018. "Constructing strategies in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 185-219.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reputation mechanisms; Prisoners’ dilemma; Replicator dynamics; C70; C72; D62; D83;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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