Walras and Darwin: an odd couple?
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-006-0037-1
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- Jack Vromen, 2011. "Heterogeneous Economic Evolution: A Different View on Darwinizing Evolutionary Economics," Chapters, in: John B. Davis & D. Wade Hands (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Reinoud Joosten & Berend Roorda, 2011. "On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 74(2), pages 147-161, October.
- Ulrich Witt, 2009.
"Novelty and the bounds of unknowledge in economics,"
Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 361-375.
- Ulrich Witt, 2007. "Novelty and the Bounds of Unknowledge in Economics," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2007-07, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
- Isabel Almudi & Francisco Fatas-Villafranca & Jason Potts, 2017. "Utopia competition: a new approach to the micro-foundations of sustainability transitions," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 165-185, April.
- Reinoud Joosten, 2009. "Paul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-16, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
- Brendan Markey-Towler, 2016. "Law of the jungle: firm survival and price dynamics in evolutionary markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 655-696, July.
- Reinoud Joosten & Berend Roorda, 2011. "Attractive evolutionary equilibria," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2011-17, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
- Zhijian Wang & Bin Xu, 2014. "Cycling in stochastic general equilibrium," Papers 1410.8432, arXiv.org.
- George Liagouras, 2017. "The challenge of Evo-Devo: implications for evolutionary economists," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 795-823, September.
- Reinoud Joosten & Berend Roorda, 2008. "Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-11, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
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More about this item
Keywords
General equilibrium theory; Evolutionary game theory; A12; C62; C72; C73; D83;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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