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A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol

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  • Sang-Chul Suh
  • Quan Wen

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  • Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:203-226
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0365-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, September.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    5. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
    6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    7. Ilya Segal, 2003. "Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(2), pages 439-460.
    8. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 260-276, August.
    9. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
    10. Haller, Hans, 1986. "Non-cooperative bargaining of N [ges] 3 players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 11-13.
    11. Evans, Robert, 1997. "Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 211-220, May.
    12. Asheim, Geir B., 1992. "A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 169-181, April.
    13. Baliga Sandeep & Serrano Roberto, 1995. "Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 578-589, December.
    14. Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
    15. Chae Suchan & Yang Jeong-Ae, 1994. "An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 86-102, February.
    16. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
    17. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
    18. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
    19. Serrano, Roberto, 1993. "Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(4), pages 345-357.
    20. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 583-606, October.
    21. Kalyan Chatterjee & Hamid Sabourian, 2000. "Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1491-1510, November.
    22. Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1992. "Another n-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 275-277, March.
    23. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. BEDAYO, Mikel & MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2012. "Bargaining and delay in trading networks," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2012046, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Bedayo, Mikel & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2016. "Bargaining in endogenous trading networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 70-82.
    3. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 364-379.
    4. Soumendu Sarkar & Dhritiman Gupta, 2023. "Bargaining for assembly," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 229-254, August.
    5. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    6. Jun Xiao, 2012. "Bargaining Order in a Multi-Person Bargaining Game," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1150, The University of Melbourne.
    7. Berthomé, Guy-El-Karim & Thomas, Alban, 2017. "A Context-based Procedure for Assessing Participatory Schemes in Environmental Planning," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 113-123.
    8. Qi Feng & Chengzhang Li & Mengshi Lu & J. George Shanthikumar, 2022. "Implementing Environmental and Social Responsibility Programs in Supply Networks Through Multiunit Bilateral Negotiation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 2579-2599, April.
    9. Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael, 2015. "Breakdown in multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 478-484.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous protocol; Multilateral bargaining; Subgame perfect equilibrium; C72; C78;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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