Bank's skin-in-the-game and hold-up by illiquid firms: strategic bargaining, dynamic inconsistency and credit constraints
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Keywords
Hold-up; Credit constraints; Subgame perfection; Non-cooperative bargaining; Outside option principle; Perfect equilibrium partition; Strategic default; Liquidity; Long-term loan; Skin in the game; Unverifiability; Interest-bearing asset; Strategic bargaining; Bank; Firm; Loan relationship;All these keywords.
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