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Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units

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  • Indranil Chakraborty

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  • Indranil Chakraborty, 2006. "Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 197-211, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:29:y:2006:i:1:p:197-211
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0009-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    3. Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 337-351, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Raphael Calel, 2010. "Auctioning conservation contracts in thepresence of externalities," GRI Working Papers 22, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
    2. Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2007. "Designing Multi‐unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent‐based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 83(s1), pages 57-72, September.
    3. Kokott, Gian-Marco & Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2019. "The beauty of Dutch: Ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(1), pages 202-210.
    4. Eaves, James & Williams, Jeffrey & Power, Gabriel J., 2016. "Do traders strategically time their pledges during real-world Walrasian auctions?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 109-118.
    5. Sumit Joshi & Poorvi Vora, 2013. "Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 657-696, August.
    6. Paulsen, Per & Bichler, Martin & Kokott, Gian-Marco, 2021. "The beauty of Dutch: Bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 291(2), pages 711-721.
    7. Francisco Alvarez & Cristina Mazón, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 35-70, September.
    8. Wittwer, Milena, 2020. "Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 506-530.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-unit auctions; Pay-as-bid rule; D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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