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The norm game: punishing enemies and not friends

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  • K. Kułakowski

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  • K. Kułakowski, 2009. "The norm game: punishing enemies and not friends," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 4(1), pages 27-37, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:27-37
    DOI: 10.1007/s11403-009-0045-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
    2. Anna Dreber & David G. Rand & Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak, 2008. "Winners don’t punish," Nature, Nature, vol. 452(7185), pages 348-351, March.
    3. Erez Lieberman & Christoph Hauert & Martin A. Nowak, 2005. "Evolutionary dynamics on graphs," Nature, Nature, vol. 433(7023), pages 312-316, January.
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