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Reward from Punishment Does Not Emerge at All Costs

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  • Jeromos Vukov
  • Flávio L Pinheiro
  • Francisco C Santos
  • Jorge M Pacheco

Abstract

The conundrum of cooperation has received increasing attention during the last decade. In this quest, the role of altruistic punishment has been identified as a mechanism promoting cooperation. Here we investigate the role of altruistic punishment on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations exhibiting connectivity patterns recently identified as key elements of social networks. We do so in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory, employing the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Stag-Hunt metaphors to model the conflict between individual and collective interests regarding cooperation. We find that the impact of altruistic punishment strongly depends on the ratio q/p between the cost of punishing a defecting partner (q) and the actual punishment incurred by the partner (p). We show that whenever q/p

Suggested Citation

  • Jeromos Vukov & Flávio L Pinheiro & Francisco C Santos & Jorge M Pacheco, 2013. "Reward from Punishment Does Not Emerge at All Costs," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(1), pages 1-6, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1002868
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002868
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    1. Du, Faqi & Fu, Feng, 2013. "Quantifying the impact of noise on macroscopic organization of cooperation in spatial games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 35-44.
    2. Jonathan E Bone & Brian Wallace & Redouan Bshary & Nichola J Raihani, 2015. "The Effect of Power Asymmetries on Cooperation and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(1), pages 1-15, January.
    3. Perc, Matjaž & Grigolini, Paolo, 2013. "Collective behavior and evolutionary games – An introduction," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 1-5.
    4. Luo-Luo Jiang & Matjaž Perc & Attila Szolnoki, 2013. "If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-7, May.
    5. Lv, Shaojie & Li, Jiaying & Zhao, Changheng, 2023. "The evolution of cooperation in voluntary public goods game with shared-punishment," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).

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