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Policy choices and compliance behavior in pandemic times

Author

Listed:
  • Giorgio Calcagnini

    (University of Urbino Carlo Bo)

  • Slađana Pavlinović Mršić

    (University of Split)

  • Laura Policardo

    (Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli)

  • Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

    (University of Urbino Carlo Bo
    CIMA UAdeC)

Abstract

In this paper, we model an evolutionary noncooperative game between politicians and citizens that, given the level of infection, describes the observed variety of mitigation policies and citizens’ compliance during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Our results show that different stable equilibria exist and that different ways/paths exist to reach these equilibria may be present, depending on the choice of parameters. When the parameters are chosen opportunistically, in the short run, our model generates transitions between hard and soft policy measures to deal with the pandemic. In the long-run, convergence is achieved toward one of the possible stable steady states (obey or not obey lockdown rules) as functions of politicians’ and citizens’ incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgio Calcagnini & Slađana Pavlinović Mršić & Laura Policardo & Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera, 2024. "Policy choices and compliance behavior in pandemic times," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 19(4), pages 587-615, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:19:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11403-023-00380-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11403-023-00380-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wright, Austin L. & Sonin, Konstantin & Driscoll, Jesse & Wilson, Jarnickae, 2020. "Poverty and economic dislocation reduce compliance with COVID-19 shelter-in-place protocols," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 544-554.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Iván Werning & Michael D. Whinston, 2021. "Optimal Targeted Lockdowns in a Multigroup SIR Model," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 487-502, December.
    3. Bosi, Stefano & Camacho, Carmen & Desmarchelier, David, 2021. "Optimal lockdown in altruistic economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    4. Bargain, Olivier & Aminjonov, Ulugbek, 2020. "Trust and compliance to public health policies in times of COVID-19," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    5. Abel Brodeur & David Gray & Anik Islam & Suraiya Bhuiyan, 2021. "A literature review of the economics of COVID‐19," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 1007-1044, September.
    6. Timothy C Reluga, 2010. "Game Theory of Social Distancing in Response to an Epidemic," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(5), pages 1-9, May.
    7. Gordon, Daniel V. & Grafton, R. Quentin & Steinshamn, Stein Ivar, 2021. "Cross-country effects and policy responses to COVID-19 in 2020: The Nordic countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 198-210.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary games and replicator dynamics; Infection levels; Stringency effects; Socioeconomic costs; Psychological benefits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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