IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jecfin/v38y2014i1p96-118.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction

Author

Listed:
  • Khalid Kisswani

Abstract

Two oil price shocks changed the pattern of cheap oil. The first was the Arab embargo on oil exports in 1973. Oil prices rose five fold. In 1978, the second was the fall of Shah Iran. Prices soared to $80–$100 a barrel in today’s prices. In 1960, OPEC was established and since then it has been a considerable political and economic force in the oil market. Two thirds of the world’s oil reserves belong to OPEC members. OPEC is accused of being responsible for most of the price increases due to their production cuts and market power. This paper provides a general framework to examine the role of OPEC in affecting oil prices through the extracted quantities. A mathematical model is developed to explore the objective function of OPEC, which includes economic and political considerations. The idea is that OPEC members consider both the political support of their citizens and profits when determining oil extraction rates. This support is represented by a “harm function” which was added to the objective function of OPEC. The solution of the model lends some support for inclusion of this harm function, through which OPEC benefits from the cuts in production aimed at harming the western countries. For this harm function to be meaningful empirically, OPEC members should have a high harm indicator, α t . With high harm indicator values, OPEC harms itself financially. The results suggest that OPEC appears to be accepting considerable monetary setbacks to appease its citizens’ taste for harming the West. At different discount rates, the monetary losses range from about 10–20%. Solving the mathematical model required estimation of the residual demand that OPEC faces plus the cost function that applies to OPEC production. This paper reports the results of these estimations. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Khalid Kisswani, 2014. "OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 38(1), pages 96-118, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:38:y:2014:i:1:p:96-118
    DOI: 10.1007/s12197-011-9206-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12197-011-9206-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s12197-011-9206-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abel, Andrew B, 1990. "Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching Up with the Joneses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 38-42, May.
    2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    3. Christensen, Laurits R & Jorgenson, Dale W & Lau, Lawrence J, 1973. "Transcendental Logarithmic Production Frontiers," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 55(1), pages 28-45, February.
    4. Ramcharran, Harri, 2001. "OPEC's production under fluctuating oil prices: further test of the target revenue theory," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 667-681, November.
    5. D. Chapman & N. Khanna, 2000. "World oil: the growing case for international policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(1), pages 1-13, January.
    6. James L. Smith, 2005. "Inscrutable OPEC? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis," The Energy Journal, , vol. 26(1), pages 51-82, January.
    7. Slade, Margaret E., 1982. "Trends in natural-resource commodity prices: An analysis of the time domain," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 122-137, June.
    8. Robert K. Kaufmann & Stephane Dees & Pavlos Karadeloglou & Marcelo Sanchez, 2004. "Does OPEC Matter? An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices," The Energy Journal, , vol. 25(4), pages 67-90, October.
    9. M. Mazraati & S.M. Tayyebi Jazayeri, 2004. "Oil price movements and production agreements," OPEC Energy Review, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, vol. 28(3), pages 207-226, September.
    10. Duane Chapman & Neha Khanna, 2001. "An Economic Analysis Of Aspects Of Petroleum And Military Security In The Persian Gulf," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 371-381, October.
    11. Horn, Manfred, 2004. "OPEC's optimal crude oil price," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 269-280, January.
    12. B. Moazzami & F. J. Anderson, 1994. "Modelling Natural Resource Scarcity Using the 'Error-Correction' Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(4), pages 801-812, November.
    13. Wasserfallen, Walter & Guntensperger, Heinz, 1988. "Gasoline consumption and the stock of motor vehicles : An empirical analysis for the Swiss economy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 276-282, October.
    14. Griffin, James M & Xiong, Weiwen, 1997. "The Incentive to Cheat: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(2), pages 289-316, October.
    15. Robert Mabro, 1992. "OPEC and the Price of Oil," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    16. Ramanathan, R., 1999. "Short- and long-run elasticities of gasoline demand in India: An empirical analysis using cointegration techniques," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 321-330, August.
    17. Pindyck, Robert S, 1978. "Gains to Producers from the Cartelization of Exhaustible Resources," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 238-251, May.
    18. A.F Alhajji & David Huettner, 2000. "OPEC and World Crude Oil Markets from 1973 to 1994: Cartel, Oligopoly, or Competitive?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 31-60.
    19. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-661, September.
    20. Griffin, James M, 1985. "OPEC Behavior: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 954-963, December.
    21. Polasky, Stephen, 1992. "The private and social value of information: Exploration for exhaustible resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-21, July.
    22. Eltony, M. N. & Al-Mutairi, N. H., 1995. "Demand for gasoline in Kuwait : An empirical analysis using cointegration techniques," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 249-253, July.
    23. Carol A. Dahl, 1986. "Gasoline Demand Survey," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 67-82.
    24. Baltagi, Badi H. & Griffin, James M., 1983. "Gasoline demand in the OECD : An application of pooling and testing procedures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 117-137, July.
    25. Harold Hotelling, 1931. "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 137-137.
    26. Salant, Stephen W, 1976. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 1079-1093, October.
    27. Blum, U.C.H. & Foos, G. & Gaudry, M.J.I., 1986. "Aggregate Time Series Gasoline Demand Models. Review of the Literature and New Evidence for West Germany," Cahiers de recherche 8617, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    28. Tang, Linghui & Hammoudeh, Shawkat, 2002. "An empirical exploration of the world oil price under the target zone model," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 577-596, November.
    29. Clifton T. Jones, 1990. "OPEC Behaviour Under Falling Prices: Implications For Cartel Stability," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 117-130.
    30. Wirl, Franz, 2008. "Why do oil prices jump (or fall)?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 1029-1043, March.
    31. Geoffrey Heal & Michael Barrow, 1980. "The Relationship between Interest Rates and Metal Price Movements," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(1), pages 161-181.
    32. Cremer, Jacques & Weitzman, Martin L., 1976. "OPEC and the monopoly price of world oil," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 155-164, August.
    33. Porter, Robert H., 1983. "Optimal cartel trigger price strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 313-338, April.
    34. Thomas D. Willett, 1979. "Structure of OPEC and the Outlook for International Oil Prices," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 51-64, January.
    35. Christopher Garbacz, 1989. "Gasoline, Diesel and Motorfuel Demand in Taiwan," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 153-163.
    36. Pollak, Robert A, 1970. "Habit Formation and Dynamic Demand Functions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(4), pages 745-763, Part I Ju.
    37. Robert McRae, 1994. "Gasoline Demand in Developing Asian Countries," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 143-156.
    38. Jeffrey A. Krautkraemer, 1998. "Nonrenewable Resource Scarcity," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 2065-2107, December.
    39. Watkins, G. C. & Streifel, Shane S., 1998. "World crude oil supply: Evidence from estimating supply functions by country," Journal of Energy Finance & Development, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 23-48.
    40. Adelman, M. A. & Shahi, Manoj, 1989. "Oil development-operating cost estimates, 1955-1985," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 2-10, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ansari, Dawud, 2017. "OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the shale revolution: Insights from equilibrium modelling and oil politics," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 111, pages 166-178.
    2. Kisswani, Khalid M., 2016. "Does OPEC act as a cartel? Empirical investigation of coordination behavior," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 171-180.
    3. Lin, Boqiang & Omoju, Oluwasola E. & Okonkwo, Jennifer U., 2015. "Will disruptions in OPEC oil supply have permanent impact on the global oil market?," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1312-1321.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cologni, Alessandro & Manera, Matteo, 2014. "On the economic determinants of oil production," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 68-79.
    2. Bharati, Rakesh & Crain, Susan J. & Kaminski, Vincent, 2012. "Clustering in crude oil prices and the target pricing zone hypothesis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1115-1123.
    3. Kheiravar, Khaled H, 2019. "Economic and Econometric Analyses of the World Petroleum Industry, Energy Subsidies, and Air Pollution," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt3gj151w9, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.
    4. Reynolds, Douglas B. & Pippenger, Michael K., 2010. "OPEC and Venezuelan oil production: Evidence against a cartel hypothesis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(10), pages 6045-6055, October.
    5. Antonio Fernandois & Carlos A. Medel, 2020. "Geopolitical tensions, OPEC news, and the oil price: A granger causality analysis," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 35(2), pages 57-90, October.
    6. Golombek, Rolf & Irarrazabal, Alfonso A. & Ma, Lin, 2018. "OPEC's market power: An empirical dominant firm model for the oil market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 98-115.
    7. Kaushik Ranjan Bandyopadhyay, 2022. "Oil and Gas Markets and COVID-19: A Critical Rumination on Drivers, Triggers, and Volatility," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(8), pages 1-21, April.
    8. Wirl, Franz, 2008. "Why do oil prices jump (or fall)?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 1029-1043, March.
    9. Slaibi, Ahmad & Chapman, Duane & Daouk, Hazem, 2005. "An Econometric Evaluation of A Geopolitical Theory of Oil Price Behavior," Working Papers 127131, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    10. Lin, C.Y. Cynthia, 2009. "An Empirical Dynamic Model of OPEC and Non-OPEC," Working Papers 225895, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    11. Wirl, Franz, 2015. "Output adjusting cartels facing dynamic, convex demand under uncertainty: The case of OPEC," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 307-316.
    12. Margaret E. Slade & Henry Thille, 2009. "Whither Hotelling: Tests of the Theory of Exhaustible Resources," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 239-259, September.
    13. Ramcharran, Harri, 2002. "Oil production responses to price changes: an empirical application of the competitive model to OPEC and non-OPEC countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 97-106, March.
    14. Okullo, Samuel J. & Reynès, Frédéric & Hofkes, Marjan W., 2015. "Modeling peak oil and the geological constraints on oil production," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 36-56.
    15. Greene, David L & Jones, Donald W & Leiby, Paul N, 1998. "The outlook for US oil dependence," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 55-69, January.
    16. Parnes, Dror, 2019. "Heterogeneous noncompliance with OPEC's oil production cuts," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 289-300.
    17. Durand-Lasserve, Olivier & Pierru, Axel, 2021. "Modeling world oil market questions: An economic perspective," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    18. Berk, Istemi & Çam, Eren, 2020. "The shift in global crude oil market structure: A model-based analysis of the period 2013–2017," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    19. Kolstad, Charles D., 2000. "Energy and Depletable Resources: Economics and Policy, 1973-1998," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 282-305, May.
    20. Devarajan, Shantayanan & Fisher, Anthony C, 1981. "Hotelling's "Economics of Exhaustible Resources": Fifty Years Later," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 65-73, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    OPEC; Optimal Control; Cost Estimation; Demand Estimation; Resource Economics; C02; C20; C51; Q31; Q32; Q34; Q41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • C20 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - General
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:38:y:2014:i:1:p:96-118. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.