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World oil: the growing case for international policy

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  • D. Chapman
  • N. Khanna

Abstract

Can the economic theory of depletion be reconciled with low petroleum prices? This article uses a revision of the theory, which reflects demand functions that rise in response to increasing world population and income. The magnitude of producers' and consumers' surplus is estimated under both competitive and monopolistic assumptions; the result indicates a present value comparable to or in excess of today's gross world economic product. Game theory suggests a framework that explains the interaction between oil pricing and military policy, and the economic incentives that result in a general pattern of recent market equilibrium crude oil prices often fluctuating with a $15–20 per barrel range. The analysis concludes that the economic incentives for political instability in the Persian Gulf will increase, and more formal methods of setting the international framework for Persian Gulf oil may be expected.

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  • D. Chapman & N. Khanna, 2000. "World oil: the growing case for international policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(1), pages 1-13, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:18:y:2000:i:1:p:1-13
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00001.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-661, September.
    2. John Rowse, 1988. "Does an Exhaustible Resource Usually Have Many Near-Optimal Depletion Paths?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 70(3), pages 646-653.
    3. Hall, Darwin C., 1992. "Oil and nationalal security," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(11), pages 1089-1096, November.
    4. Pindyck, Robert S, 1978. "Gains to Producers from the Cartelization of Exhaustible Resources," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 238-251, May.
    5. M. A. Adelman, 1986. "The Competitive Floor to World Oil Prices," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 9-31.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Slaibi, Ahmad & Chapman, Duane & Daouk, Hazem, 2005. "An Econometric Evaluation of A Geopolitical Theory of Oil Price Behavior," Working Papers 127131, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    2. Lin, C.Y. Cynthia, 2009. "An Empirical Dynamic Model of OPEC and Non-OPEC," Working Papers 225895, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    3. Duane Chapman & Neha Khanna, 2001. "An Economic Analysis Of Aspects Of Petroleum And Military Security In The Persian Gulf," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 371-381, October.
    4. Duane Chapman & Neha Khanna, 2006. "The Persian Gulf, Global Oil Resources, And International Security," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 24(4), pages 507-519, October.
    5. Khalid Kisswani, 2014. "OPEC and political considerations when deciding on oil extraction," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 38(1), pages 96-118, January.
    6. Chapman, Duane, 2001. "A Review of the New Undiscovered Conventional Crude Oil Resource Estimates and their Economic and Environmental Implications," Working Papers 127669, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    7. Hui, Cho-Hoi & Lo, Chi-Fai & Cheung, Chi-Hin & Wong, Andrew, 2020. "Crude oil price dynamics with crash risk under fundamental shocks," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    8. Tang, Linghui & Hammoudeh, Shawkat, 2002. "An empirical exploration of the world oil price under the target zone model," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 577-596, November.
    9. Bharati, Rakesh & Crain, Susan J. & Kaminski, Vincent, 2012. "Clustering in crude oil prices and the target pricing zone hypothesis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 1115-1123.
    10. Gallo, Andres & Mason, Paul & Shapiro, Steve & Fabritius, Michael, 2010. "What is behind the increase in oil prices? Analyzing oil consumption and supply relationship with oil price," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 4126-4141.
    11. Kheiravar, Khaled H, 2019. "Economic and Econometric Analyses of the World Petroleum Industry, Energy Subsidies, and Air Pollution," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt3gj151w9, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.

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