Two approximation algorithms for maximizing nonnegative weakly monotonic set functions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s10878-022-00978-4
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Melo, M.T. & Nickel, S. & Saldanha-da-Gama, F., 2009. "Facility location and supply chain management - A review," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(2), pages 401-412, July.
- Suning Gong & Qingqin Nong & Wenjing Liu & Qizhi Fang, 2019. "Parametric monotone function maximization with matroid constraints," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 833-849, November.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004.
"Putting Auction Theory to Work,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
- Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521551847.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Becker, Tristan & Lier, Stefan & Werners, Brigitte, 2019. "Value of modular production concepts in future chemical industry production networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 276(3), pages 957-970.
- Venn, Tyron J. & Dorries, Jack W. & McGavin, Robert L., 2021. "A mathematical model to support investment in veneer and LVL manufacturing in subtropical eastern Australia," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
- Brunner, Christoph & Hu, Audrey & Oechssler, Jörg, 2014.
"Premium auctions and risk preferences: An experimental study,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 467-484.
- Brunner, Christoph & Hu, Audrey & Oechssler, Jörg, 2013. "Premium Auctions and Risk Preferences: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 0544, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
- Frank Kelly & Peter Key & Neil Walton, 2016. "Efficient Advert Assignment," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(4), pages 822-837, August.
- Yokote, Koji, 2021. "Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Bartosz Sawik, 2024. "Optimizing Last-Mile Delivery: A Multi-Criteria Approach with Automated Smart Lockers, Capillary Distribution and Crowdshipping," Logistics, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-30, May.
- Sauvey, Christophe & Melo, Teresa & Correia, Isabel, 2019. "Two-phase heuristics for a multi-period capacitated facility location problem with service-differentiated customers," Technical Reports on Logistics of the Saarland Business School 16, Saarland University of Applied Sciences (htw saar), Saarland Business School.
- M. Fattahi & M. Mahootchi & S. M. Moattar Husseini, 2016. "Integrated strategic and tactical supply chain planning with price-sensitive demands," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 242(2), pages 423-456, July.
- Hasani, Aliakbar & Khosrojerdi, Amirhossein, 2016. "Robust global supply chain network design under disruption and uncertainty considering resilience strategies: A parallel memetic algorithm for a real-life case study," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 20-52.
- Robert Kleinberg & Bo Waggoner & E. Glen Weyl, 2016. "Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search," Papers 1603.07682, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2016.
- Hu, Audrey & Offerman, Theo & Zou, Liang, 2011. "Premium auctions and risk preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2420-2439.
- A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015.
"An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
- Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2011. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Paper 2011-096, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2011. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Other publications TiSEM 49292c72-515d-42f4-a0d4-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 13/31, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2008.
"Vickrey allocation rule with income effect,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 391-401, May.
- Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2005. "Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect," ISER Discussion Paper 0646, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Burguet, Roberto, 2008.
"Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo-Dutch auction meets another simple alternative,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 730-745, May.
- Helmuts Äzacis & Roberto Burguet, 2005. "Incumbency and Entry in Licence Auctions: The Anglo-Dutch Auctions Meets other Simple Alternatives," Working Papers 223, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Azacis, Helmuts & Burguet, Roberto, 2005. "Incumbency and Entry in License Auctions: The Anglo-Dutch Auction Meets Other Simple Alternatives," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2005/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Yutaka Suzuki, 2021. "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 22(2), pages 317-365, November.
- Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Saulle, Riccardo D., 2024.
"Designing rotation programs: Limits and possibilities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 77-102.
- Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Riccardo Saulle, 2022. "Designing Rotation Programs: Limits and Possibilities," Working Papers 202221, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005.
"Pairwise kidney exchange,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 151-188, December.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sönmez, Tayfun & Utku Ünver, M. & Roth, Alvin E., 2005. "Pairwise kidney exchange," Scholarly Articles 32072400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0408001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Feb 2005.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 620, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April.
- Iván Marinovic, 2017. "Delegated Bidding and the Allocative Effect of Accounting Rules," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(7), pages 2181-2196, July.
- Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2017.
"On strategic complementarities in discontinuous games with totally ordered strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 147-153.
- Pavlo Prokopovych & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2015. "On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies," Discussion Papers 56, Kyiv School of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
Unconstrained; Non-submodular; Weakly-monotone; Greedy;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:45:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s10878-022-00978-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.