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Equivalence of two-sided stable matching

Author

Listed:
  • Liwei Zhong

    (Shanghai University)

  • Yanqin Bai

    (Shanghai University)

Abstract

In this article, we study a one-to-many two-sides matching problem. This one-to-many two-sides matching problem can be converted into one-to-one two-sides matching problem, and the equivalence between them is proved.

Suggested Citation

  • Liwei Zhong & Yanqin Bai, 2018. "Equivalence of two-sided stable matching," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 36(4), pages 1380-1387, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jcomop:v:36:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s10878-018-0308-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10878-018-0308-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E, 1986. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 425-427, March.
    2. Eric J. McDermid & David F. Manlove, 2010. "Keeping partners together: algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 279-303, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Qin Yang & Jinfeng Liu & Xing Liu & Cejun Cao & Wei Zhang, 2019. "A Two-Sided Matching Model for Task Distribution in Ridesharing: A Sustainable Operations Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(7), pages 1-16, April.
    2. Baodong Li & Yu Yang & Jiafu Su & Zhichao Liang & Sheng Wang, 2020. "Two-sided matching decision-making model with hesitant fuzzy preference information for configuring cloud manufacturing tasks and resources," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 31(8), pages 2033-2047, December.

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