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Effect of Order of Contribution in a Sequential Public Goods Dilemma

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  • Wing Tung Au

    (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

  • Man Wing Chung

    (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

This study examined how order of contribution in a sequential public goods dilemma affected cooperation. Under a sequential protocol of play, players of different levels of efficacy made decisions one after another. We contrasted a High-to-low versus Low-to-high Efficacy order in a nine-person game. Under a High-to-low order, high-efficacy players made decisions in positions 1–3, medium-efficacy players in positions 4–6, and low-efficacy players in positions 7–9. Under a Low-to-high order, the positions of high- and low-efficacy players were reversed. We hypothesized that cooperation rates would be higher in the High-to-low order that high-efficacy players (assigned in early positions), who would likely cooperate, would induce subsequent players to cooperate also. We found the anticipated effect that cooperation rate was higher in the High-to-low than the Low-to-high efficacy order. The efficacy order effect was the most prominent when people perceived that their group was becoming uncooperative. This study illustrates a new type of structural solution to social dilemmas that by systematically assigning people to different sequential positions, a group can be made more or less cooperative.

Suggested Citation

  • Wing Tung Au & Man Wing Chung, 2007. "Effect of Order of Contribution in a Sequential Public Goods Dilemma," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 16(5), pages 437-449, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:16:y:2007:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-006-9067-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-006-9067-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chen, Xiao-Ping & Au, Wing Tung & Komorita, S. S., 1996. "Sequential Choice in a Step-Level Public Goods Dilemma: The Effects of Criticality and Uncertainty," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 37-47, January.
    2. Davis, Douglas D. & Holt, Charles a., 1993. "Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 8(2), pages 179-212.
    3. Ryan O. Murphy & Amnon Rapoport & James E. Parco, 2004. "Population Learning of Cooperative Behavior in a Three-Person Centipede Game," Rationality and Society, , vol. 16(1), pages 91-120, February.
    4. R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(1), pages 179-199.
    5. Ido Erev & Amnon Rapoport, 1990. "Provision of Step-Level Public Goods," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 401-425, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Utteeyo Dasgupta & Wafa Hakim Orman, 2014. "Does Heterogeneity Help in Overcoming the Public Goods Dilemma in a Sequential Contribution Environment?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 1219-1239, September.
    2. Schippers, Anouk L. & Soetevent, Adriaan R., 2024. "Sharing with minimal regulation? Evidence from neighborhood book exchange," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
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    4. Jing Yu & Martin G. Kocher, 2023. "Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 685-712, October.
    5. Cecilia Rossignoli & Francesca Ricciardi & Sabrina Bonomi, 2018. "Organizing for Commons-Enabling Decision-Making Under Conflicting Institutional Logics in Social Entrepreneurship," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 417-443, June.

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