A consensus reaching process in the context of non-uniform ordered qualitative scales
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s10700-016-9256-6
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2011. "Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262015137, April.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2022.
"Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting,"
Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 70(3), pages 1296-1316, May.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2018. "Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting," Working Papers 2018-15, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2016. "Two types of participation failure under nine voting methods in variable electorates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 115-135, July.
- Steven Brams & Richard Potthoff, 2015.
"The paradox of grading systems,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 193-210, December.
- Brams, Steven & Potthoff, Richard, 2015. "The Paradox of Grading Systems," MPRA Paper 63268, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Antonin Macé, 2017. "Voting with evaluations: characterizations of evaluative voting and range voting," Working Papers halshs-01222200, HAL.
- Arnold Cédrick SOH VOUTSA, 2020. "Approval Voting & Majority Judgment in Weighted Representative Democracy," THEMA Working Papers 2020-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Marcus Pivato, 2013.
"Voting rules as statistical estimators,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 581-630, February.
- Pivato, Marcus, 2011. "Voting rules as statistical estimators," MPRA Paper 30292, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & McBurney, Peter & Riley, Luke, 2019.
"Voting over a distributed ledger: An interdisciplinary perspective,"
CAGE Online Working Paper Series
416, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & McBurney, Peter & Riley, Luke, 2020. "Voting over a Distributed Ledger: An interdisciplinary perspective," SocArXiv 34df5, Center for Open Science.
- Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017.
"Evaluationwise strategy-proofness,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
- Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver & Shin Sato, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Post-Print hal-02517255, HAL.
- Bora Erdamar & José Luis Garcia-Lapresta & David Pérez-Roman & Remzi Sanver, 2012. "Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context," Working Papers hal-00681297, HAL.
- Michel L. Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2015. "Majority Measures," Working Papers hal-01137173, HAL.
- Vincent Merlin & İpek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019.
"Compromise Rules Revisited,"
Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 63-78, February.
- Vincent Merlin & Ipek Özkal Sanver & M. Remzi Sanver, 2019. "Compromise Rules Revisited," Post-Print halshs-02065282, HAL.
- Youssef Allouah & Rachid Guerraoui & L^e-Nguy^en Hoang & Oscar Villemaud, 2022. "Robust Sparse Voting," Papers 2202.08656, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
- Rida Laraki & Estelle Varloot, 2021. "Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms," Papers 2108.04705, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
- Lachat, Romain & Laslier, Jean-François, 2024.
"Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
- Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-04630321, HAL.
- Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," Post-Print halshs-04630321, HAL.
- Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier, 2024. "Alternatives to plurality rule for single-winner elections: When do they make a difference?," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-04630321, HAL.
- Klaus Nehring & Marcus Pivato, 2022.
"The median rule in judgement aggregation,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 1051-1100, June.
- Nehring, Klaus & Pivato, Marcus, 2018. "The median rule in judgement aggregation," MPRA Paper 84258, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Klaus Nehring & Marcus Pivato, 2022. "The median rule in judgement aggregation," Post-Print hal-03637880, HAL.
- Adrien Fabre, 2021.
"Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 101-124, January.
- Adrien Fabre, 2020. "Tie-breaking the Highest Median: Alternatives to the Majority Judgment," Post-Print halshs-04363059, HAL.
- Adrien Fabre, 2020. "Tie-breaking the Highest Median: Alternatives to the Majority Judgment," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-04363059, HAL.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2020.
"Majority judgment vs. majority rule,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 429-461, March.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2016. "Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule," Working Papers hal-01304043, HAL.
- Stefano Vannucci, 2022. "Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem," Papers 2210.03200, arXiv.org.
- García-Lapresta, José Luis & Marques Pereira, Ricardo Alberto, 2022. "An extension of Majority Judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 301(2), pages 667-674.
- Riako Granzier & Vincent Pons & Clemence Tricaud, 2023.
"Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 177-217, October.
- Riako Granzier & Vincent Pons & Clémence Tricaud, 2019. "Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates," NBER Working Papers 26599, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
Keywords
Group decision making; Consensus; Qualitative scales; Ordinal proximity measures;All these keywords.
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:fuzodm:v:16:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10700-016-9256-6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.