IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/eurphb/v94y2021i5d10.1140_epjb_s10051-021-00101-2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The effect of memory and vision range on cooperators dynamics in donation game

Author

Listed:
  • Niloufar Najafian

    (Isfahan University of Technology)

  • Farhad Ferdowsi

    (Isfahan University of Technology)

  • Keivan Aghababaei Samani

    (Isfahan University of Technology)

Abstract

Although most studies in the field of game-driven population dynamics are concentrated on imitation update rule, it is the logit update rule that is dominated in many cases in society. Despite the fact that it may seem to be an intelligence method to choose the most profitable strategy, it often can lead to a lower level of cooperation in society. This study aims at investigating the effect of using an extra source of information in the process of each strategy profitability estimation. Our simulation shows that making decisions based on these new sources of information can improve the logit update rule and make cooperators more resistant against defection. Moreover, increasing information gathering area and memory power as much as possible does not necessarily in the favor of cooperation level in society. instead, maximum average cooperation level occurs in moderate values of vision range and memory damping coefficient. Effective probable mechanisms in happening such a phenomenon are also discussed. Graphic abstract

Suggested Citation

  • Niloufar Najafian & Farhad Ferdowsi & Keivan Aghababaei Samani, 2021. "The effect of memory and vision range on cooperators dynamics in donation game," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 94(5), pages 1-8, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:94:y:2021:i:5:d:10.1140_epjb_s10051-021-00101-2
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00101-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00101-2
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00101-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
    2. Xu-Sheng Liu & Zhi-Xi Wu & Michael Z. Q. Chen & Jian-Yue Guan, 2017. "Evolutionary fate of memory-one strategies in repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in structured populations," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 90(7), pages 1-7, July.
    3. Erez Lieberman & Christoph Hauert & Martin A. Nowak, 2005. "Evolutionary dynamics on graphs," Nature, Nature, vol. 433(7023), pages 312-316, January.
    4. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    5. Rui Cong & Bin Wu & Yuanying Qiu & Long Wang, 2012. "Evolution of Cooperation Driven by Reputation-Based Migration," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(5), pages 1-7, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Feng, Sinan & Liu, Xuesong & Dong, Yida, 2022. "Limited punishment pool may promote cooperation in the public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 165(P2).
    2. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2004. "Best response equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 260-287, November.
    3. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    4. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    5. Marden, Jason R. & Shamma, Jeff S., 2012. "Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 788-808.
    6. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-35, November.
    7. Ianni, Antonella, 2001. "Learning correlated equilibria in population games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 271-294, November.
    8. Kyle Weishaar & Igor V. Erovenko, 2022. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Two-Dimensional Mobile Populations with Random and Strategic Dispersal," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-16, May.
    9. Candogan, Ozan & Ozdaglar, Asuman & Parrilo, Pablo A., 2013. "Dynamics in near-potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 66-90.
    10. Igor V. Erovenko, 2019. "The Evolution of Cooperation in One-Dimensional Mobile Populations with Deterministic Dispersal," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, January.
    11. Ui, Takashi, 2000. "A Shapley Value Representation of Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 121-135, April.
    12. Szabó, György & Hódsági, Kristóf, 2016. "The role of mixed strategies in spatial evolutionary games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 462(C), pages 198-206.
    13. Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena, 2020. "Fictitious play in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 182-206.
    14. Marden, Jason R. & Shamma, Jeff S., 2015. "Game Theory and Distributed Control****Supported AFOSR/MURI projects #FA9550-09-1-0538 and #FA9530-12-1-0359 and ONR projects #N00014-09-1-0751 and #N0014-12-1-0643," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    15. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009. "Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics," Discussion Papers 21, Kyiv School of Economics.
    16. Cheung, Man-Wah & Lahkar, Ratul, 2018. "Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 341-362.
    17. Hódsági, Kristóf & Szabó, György, 2019. "Bursts in three-strategy evolutionary ordinal potential games on a square lattice," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 525(C), pages 1379-1387.
    18. Du, Faqi & Fu, Feng, 2013. "Quantifying the impact of noise on macroscopic organization of cooperation in spatial games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 35-44.
    19. Correia, A.D. & Leestmaker, L.L. & Stoof, H.T.C. & Broere, J.J., 2022. "Asymmetric games on networks: Towards an Ising-model representation," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 593(C).
    20. Michael Kosfeld, 2002. "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 321-339.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:94:y:2021:i:5:d:10.1140_epjb_s10051-021-00101-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.