IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/envpol/v21y2019i4d10.1007_s10018-019-00243-9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Regulation of non-point source pollution under n-firm Bertrand competition

Author

Listed:
  • Toshiharu Ishikawa

    (Chuo University)

  • Akio Matsumoto

    (Chuo University)

  • Ferenc Szidarovszky

    (Corninus University)

Abstract

This study demonstrates the conditions under which an increase in the ambient charge positively or negatively affects the total level of non-point source pollutions. For this purpose, an n-firm Bertrand framework is used in which goods are differentiated and the corresponding price functions are linear. It is shown first that the effect is definitely negative in duopoly and triopoly and second that, for n $$> 4$$ > 4 , the sign of the effect depends on the number of the firms involved and the degree of substitutability.

Suggested Citation

  • Toshiharu Ishikawa & Akio Matsumoto & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2019. "Regulation of non-point source pollution under n-firm Bertrand competition," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(4), pages 579-597, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:21:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10018-019-00243-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10018-019-00243-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10018-019-00243-9
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10018-019-00243-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Akio Matsumoto & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2021. "Controlling non-point source pollution in Cournot oligopolies with hyperbolic demand," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 1-15, February.
    2. Akio Matsumoto & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2022. "N-firm oligopolies with pollution control and random profits," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 1017-1039, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Qiu, Zeyuan & Prato, Anthony A., 1999. "Accounting For Spatial Characteristics Of Watersheds In Evaluating Water Pollution Abatement Policies," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 1-15, April.
    2. Frans P. Vries & Nick Hanley, 2016. "Incentive-Based Policy Design for Pollution Control and Biodiversity Conservation: A Review," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 687-702, April.
    3. Armin Schmutzler, 1996. "Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 251-262, April.
    4. Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2013. "When does environmental regulation facilitate entry-deterring practices," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 133-152.
    5. Kozloff, Keith, 1990. "An Evaluation Of Options For Micro-Targeting Acquisition Of Cropping Rights To Reduce Nonpoint Source Water Pollution," Staff Papers 13610, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    6. Kathuria, Vinish & Sterner, Thomas, 2006. "Monitoring and enforcement: Is two-tier regulation robust? -- A case study of Ankleshwar, India," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 477-493, May.
    7. McSweeny, William T. & Shortle, James S., 1990. "Probabilistic Cost Effectiveness in Agricultural Nonpoint Pollution Control," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 95-104, July.
    8. Millock, Katrin & Xabadia, Angels & Zilberman, David, 2012. "Policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 102-116.
    9. Cloé Garnache & Scott M. Swinton & Joseph A. Herriges & Frank Lupi & R. Jan Stevenson, 2016. "Solving the Phosphorus Pollution Puzzle: Synthesis and Directions for Future Research," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1334-1359.
    10. Coria, Jessica & Villegas-Palacio, Clara, 2010. "Targeted Enforcement and Aggregate Emissions With Uniform Emission Taxes," Working Papers in Economics 455, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    11. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, 2007. "Total Liability for Excessive Harm," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 63-80, January.
    12. Stergios Athanassoglou & Glenn Sheriff & Tobias Siegfried & Woonghee Huh, 2012. "Optimal Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Multi-Cell Aquifers," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(2), pages 265-291, June.
    13. Colson, Gregory & Menapace, Luisa, 2012. "Multiple receptor ambient monitoring and firm compliance with environmental taxes under budget and target driven regulatory missions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 390-401.
    14. JunJie Wu & Bruce Babcock, 2001. "Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 173-192, February.
    15. Larry Karp, 2005. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 229-251, June.
    16. Staffan Waldo & Anton Paulrud, 2017. "Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Fisheries: The Case of Multiple Regulatory Instruments in Sweden," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(2), pages 275-295, October.
    17. Bystrom, Olof & Bromley, Daniel W., 1998. "Contracting For Nonpoint-Source Pollution Abatement," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, July.
    18. Spaeter, Sandrine & Verchère, Alban, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 71.
    19. COCHARD François & ROZAN Anne & SPAETER Sandrine, 2006. "Prevention and Compensation of Muddy Flows: Some Economic Insights," LERNA Working Papers 06.24.217, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    20. Jayasinghe-Mudalige, Udith K. & Henson, Spencer J., 2004. "Quantifying The Impact Of Economic Incentives On Firms' Food Safety Responsiveness: The Case Of Red Meat And Poultry Processing Sector In Canada," 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO 20419, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:21:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10018-019-00243-9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.