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Environmental Protection, Agency Motivations, and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana

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  • Kleit, Andrew N
  • Pierce, Meredith A
  • Hill, R Carter

Abstract

Direct environmental regulation has been in place in the United States for more than twenty-five years yet there has been little study of what actually affects regulatory enforcement levels. This study examines enforcement issues by focusing on water quality enforcement by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. The study finds that penalties are more likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more serious a firm's violation of a regulation. Penalties are also more likely, and likely to be higher, if a firm has a previous record of environmental violations. In contrast to other studies, however, we do not find that enforcement varies across regional offices. In addition, we did not find any systematic effects of the Weingast and Moran (1983) theory of legislative dominance. We did, however, find evidence of rent extraction, along the lines of McChesney (1987; 1991). Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Kleit, Andrew N & Pierce, Meredith A & Hill, R Carter, 1998. "Environmental Protection, Agency Motivations, and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 121-137, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:13:y:1998:i:2:p:121-37
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    Cited by:

    1. André, Francisco J. & Sokri, Abderrahmane & Zaccour, Georges, 2011. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 199-212, July.
    2. Jonathan Colmer & Mary F. Evans & Jay Shimshack, 2023. "Environmental citizen complaints," CEP Discussion Papers dp1903, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    3. Aaron A. Elrod & Serkan Karadas & Katherine C. Theyson, 2019. "The effect of gubernatorial political parties on monitoring and enforcement of federal environmental regulation: evidence from the Clean Water Act," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 21(2), pages 171-202, April.
    4. Caroline Cecot, 2021. "The Federal Enforcement Threat: The Effect of Overfiling Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(3), pages 534-568, September.
    5. McChesney Fred S., 1998. "Devaluing Deregulation," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 8(4), pages 379-400, December.
    6. Jinghui Lim, 2016. "The impact of monitoring and enforcement on air pollutant emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 203-222, April.
    7. Carole M. Billiet & Thomas Blondiau & Sandra Rousseau, 2014. "Punishing environmental crimes: An empirical study from lower courts to the court of appeal," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(4), pages 472-496, December.
    8. Takayoshi Shinkuma & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(2), pages 123-145, April.
    9. Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2022. "Costly sanctions and the treatment of frequent violators in regulatory settings," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    10. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    11. Heyes, Anthony, 2002. "A Theory of Filtered Enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 34-46, January.
    12. Stafford, Sarah L., 2002. "The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous Waste Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 290-308, September.
    13. Calel, Raphael & Dechezlepretre, Antoine & Venmans, Frank, 2023. "Policing carbon markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120565, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.
    15. Rousseau Sandra, 2007. "The Impact of Sanctions and Inspections on Firms’ Environmental Compliance Decisions," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0704, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    16. Arguedas, Carmen & Cabo, Francisco & Martín-Herrán, Guiomar, 2020. "Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    17. Christopher S. Decker, 2007. "Flexible enforcement and fine adjustment," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(4), pages 312-328, December.

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