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Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes

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  • Dragan Filipovich
  • Jaume Sempere

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Dragan Filipovich & Jaume Sempere, 2008. "Constitutions as self-enforcing redistributive schemes," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 103-129, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:9:y:2008:i:2:p:103-129
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-006-0027-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967.
    2. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules," Microeconomics 0211003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-712, June.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
    6. Grossman, Herschel I., 2002. ""Make us a king": anarchy, predation, and the state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 31-46, March.
    7. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
    8. C. Monica Capra & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Coordination," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 630-636, January.
    9. Roemer, John E, 1985. "Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 85-108, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio, 2017. "Pareto-improving income redistribution: expanding consumer access to the vaccines market," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 275-313, August.
    2. Lisa Grazzini & Alessandro Petretto, 2012. "Voting on devolution in a federal country with a bicameral national system," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 51-72, March.
    3. Ryota Tsuchiya, 2024. "Balance of power in a conflict model," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 379-399, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anarchy; Constitutions; Redistribution; Self-enforcement; D23; D30; D74; H10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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