IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ecogov/v9y2008i1p65-85.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

All in the family: why non-democratic leaders have more children

Author

Listed:
  • Dustin Beckett
  • Gregory Hess

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Dustin Beckett & Gregory Hess, 2008. "All in the family: why non-democratic leaders have more children," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 65-85, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:9:y:2008:i:1:p:65-85
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-007-0039-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-007-0039-y
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10101-007-0039-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, October.
    2. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(4), pages 622-645, August.
    3. Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 2001. "War and Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(4), pages 776-810, August.
    4. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jan Henryk Pierskalla, 2010. "Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(1), pages 117-145, February.
    2. Nzinga Broussard & Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2015. "(Why) Do self-employed parents have more children?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 297-321, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. CHEN, Xuezheng & GUI, Lin & WU, Tao & ZHANG, Jun, 2024. "A theory of symbiotic corruption," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 478-494.
    2. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2017. "Religious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 395-412.
    3. Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan & Suresh Naidu, 2011. "Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(3), pages 1375-1409.
    4. Monica Martinez-Bravo, 2014. "The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1244-1287, April.
    5. Shaun Larcom & Mare Sarr & Tim Willems, 2018. "Dictators Walking the Mogadishu Line: How Men Become Monsters and Monsters Become Men," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 32(3), pages 584-609.
    6. Thomas P. Tangerås & Nils‐Petter Lagerlöf, 2009. "Ethnic Diversity, Civil War and Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 1-27, March.
    7. Sutirtha Bagchi & Matthew J. Fagerstrom, 2023. "Wealth inequality and democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(1), pages 89-136, October.
    8. Gonzalez, Felipe & Prem, Mounu, 2021. "The Legacy of the Pinochet Regime," SocArXiv v5yjf, Center for Open Science.
    9. Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015. "Political entry, public policies, and the economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
    10. Takashi Kurosaki & Saumik Paul & Firman Witoelar, 2021. "Out of communal land: Clientelism through delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts," Departmental Working Papers 2021-20, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
    11. Hilton L. Root & Karen May, 2006. "Judicial Systems and Authoritarian Transitions," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 45(4), pages 1301-1321.
    12. George Tridimas, 2021. "Constitutional monarchy as power sharing," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 32(4), pages 431-461, December.
    13. S. Guriev & G. Egorov & K. Sonin, 2007. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 4.
    14. Bove, Vincenzo & Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2017. "Political repression in autocratic regimes," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 410-428.
    15. Daron Acemoglu & Tarek A. Hassan & Ahmed Tahoun, 2018. "The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(1), pages 1-42.
    16. Natalia Lamberova & Konstantin Sonin, 2018. "Economic transition and the rise of alternative institutions : Political connections in Putin's Russia," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 26(4), pages 615-648, October.
    17. Tridimas, George, 2015. "War, disenfranchisement and the fall of the ancient Athenian democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 102-117.
    18. Ishac Diwan, 2014. "Understanding Revolution In The Middle East: The Central Role Of The Middle Class," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Ishac Diwan (ed.), UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ARAB UPRISINGS, chapter 3, pages 29-56, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    19. Jørgen Juel Andersen & Niels Johannesen & David Dreyer Lassen & Elena Paltseva, 2013. "Petro Rents, Political Institutions, and Hidden Wealth: Evidence from Bank Deposits in Tax Havens," EPRU Working Paper Series 2013-03, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    20. Witte, Caroline T. & Burger, Martijn J. & Pennings, Enrico, 2020. "When political instability devaluates home-host ties," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 55(4).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D72; H1; J13; Children; Matching; Rent-seeking; Democratic versus non-democratic leadership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:9:y:2008:i:1:p:65-85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.