Why Stratification of Networks Emerges in Innovative Society: Intelligent Poly-Agent Systems Approach
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1011377532016
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- Mooweon Rhee & Tohyun Kim, 2014. "Identity-based learning and segregation in social networks under different institutional environments," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 339-368, December.
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Keywords
innovation; poly-agent system; emergence; social networks;All these keywords.
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