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Some Non-Classical Approaches to the Branderburger-Keisler Paradox

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  • Can Baskent

    (SEMAGRAMME - Semantic Analysis of Natural Language - Inria Nancy - Grand Est - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - LORIA - NLPKD - Department of Natural Language Processing & Knowledge Discovery - LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss a well-known self-referential paradox in epis-temic game theory, the Brandenburger -Keisler paradox. We approach the paradox from two different perspectives: non-well-founded set theory and paraconsistent logic.

Suggested Citation

  • Can Baskent, 2014. "Some Non-Classical Approaches to the Branderburger-Keisler Paradox," Working Papers hal-01094784, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01094784
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-01094784
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Mariotti, Thomas & Meier, Martin & Piccione, Michele, 2005. "Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 303-324, April.
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    Keywords

    Epistemic Game Theory; Paraconsistency;

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