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The collapse of the second Yatsenyuk government: roll call vote and dynamic network analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Natasha Kossovsky

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Kathleen M. Carley

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

Abstract

This paper investigates the cause of the collapse of the Second Yatsenyuk Ukrainian government in 2016 and the factions formed throughout the process using a novel method that combines roll call vote analysis and dynamic network analysis. Our findings suggest that a major factor in the dissolution of the coalition government was the 2015 constitutional amendment .We also found that the coalition split into two factions following this event: the People’s Front and Petro Poroshenko Bloc as one faction, and the Union and Fatherland as the other. This split could have a large impact on the 2019 Ukrainian Election and give current President Petro Poroshenko an advantage over Yulia Tymoshenko, who is leading in the polls.

Suggested Citation

  • Natasha Kossovsky & Kathleen M. Carley, 2020. "The collapse of the second Yatsenyuk government: roll call vote and dynamic network analysis," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 123-143, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:26:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10588-019-09294-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10588-019-09294-5
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