IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/eeupol/v7y2006i1p30-50.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Allocation of Codecision Reports in the Fifth European Parliament

Author

Listed:
  • Bjorn Hoyland

    (University College London, UK)

Abstract

This article argues that MEPs from national parties represented in the Council of Ministers are more active as rapporteurs on Codecision legislation than MEPs from national parties not represented in the Council. EP rapporteurs can be thought of as informed actors offering non-binding advice to the EP plenary. Expert committees and the Council presidency play a similar role in the Council. Compared with rapporteurs from parties not represented in the Council, EP rapporteurs from parties represented in the Council may incur lower costs in coordinating their proposals with the informed actors in the Council. If this is the case, they should be more interested in writing Codecision reports than are MEPs from parties not represented in the Council. This possibility is investigated using a data set consisting of all Codecision legislation initiated by the Commission between 1999 and 2004.

Suggested Citation

  • Bjorn Hoyland, 2006. "Allocation of Codecision Reports in the Fifth European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(1), pages 30-50, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:30-50
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116506060911
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1465116506060911
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/1465116506060911?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Hix & Amie Kreppel & Abdul Noury, 2003. "The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 309-331, April.
    2. Torsten J. Selck & Bernard Steunenberg, 2004. "Between Power and Luck," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 25-46, March.
    3. Hix, Simon & Noury, Abdul & Roland, Gérard, 2005. "Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 209-234, April.
    4. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
    5. Virginie Mamadouh & Tapio Raunio, 2003. "The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 333-351, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Steffen Hurka & Michael Kaeding & Lukas Obholzer, 2015. "Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(6), pages 1230-1247, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fang-Yi Chiou & Silje SL Hermansen & Bjørn Høyland, 2020. "Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 233-254, June.
    2. Pierpaolo Settembri & Christine Neuhold, 2009. "Achieving Consensus Through Committees: Does the European Parliament Manage?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 127-151, January.
    3. Bjørn Høyland & Indraneel Sircar & Simon Hix, 2009. "Forum Section," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 143-152, March.
    4. David Marshall, 2010. "Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European Parliament committees," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(4), pages 553-575, December.
    5. Christian B. Jensen & Jonathan Slapin & Thomas König, 2007. "Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy?," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(3), pages 387-410, September.
    6. Oliver Treib & Bernd Schlipphak, 2019. "Who gets committee leadership positions in the European Parliament? Evidence from the 2014 selection process," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 219-238, June.
    7. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:48:y:2010:i::p:811-833 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Matteo Cavallaro & David Flacher & Massimo Angelo Zanetti, 2018. "Radical right parties and European economic integration: Evidence from the seventh European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 321-343, June.
    9. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:127-151 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Steffen Hurka, 2013. "Changing the output: The logic of amendment success in the European Parliament’s ENVI Committee," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(2), pages 273-296, June.
    11. Anna A. Dekalchuk & Aleksandra Khokhlova & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, 2016. "National or European Politicians? Gauging MEPs Polarity When Russia is Concerned," HSE Working papers WP BRP 35/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    12. Zoe Lefkofridi, 2020. "Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 8(1), pages 41-49.
    13. Sara Hagemann & Bjørn Høyland, 2010. "Bicameral Politics in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 811-833, September.
    14. Frank M Häge & Nils Ringe, 2020. "Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(4), pages 706-727, December.
    15. John Morgan & Felix Várdy, 2011. "On the buyability of voting bodies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 260-287, April.
    16. Edoardo Bressanelli & Christel Koop & Christine Reh, 2016. "The impact of informalisation: Early agreements and voting cohesion in the European Parliament," European Union Politics, , vol. 17(1), pages 91-113, March.
    17. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Giovannini, Alessandro & Jamet, Jean-François & Persson, Eric, 2022. "Ideology and monetary policy. The role of political parties’ stances in the European Central Bank’s parliamentary hearings," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    18. Wolfram Kaiser, 2017. "Limits of Cultural Engineering: Actors and Narratives in the European Parliament's House of European History Project," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 518-534, May.
    19. Heike Klüver & Iñaki Sagarzazu, 2013. "Ideological congruency and decision-making speed: The effect of partisanship across European Union institutions," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 388-407, September.
    20. Abdul G. Noury & Gérard Roland, 2002. "More power to the European Parliament? [‘Nice try: Should the Treaty of Nice be ratified’?]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 279-319.
    21. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May.
    22. Imre Fertő & László Á Kóczy & Attila Kovács & Balázs R Sziklai, 0. "The power ranking of the members of the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 47(5), pages 1897-1919.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:1:p:30-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.