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Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Problems

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  • Somdeb Lahiri

    (University of Witwatersrand at Johannesburg)

Abstract

In this paper we study the cooperative theory of stable outcomes for the room-mates problem modeled as a contract choice problem. We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962), yields outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly Pareto Optimal for firms. Under the additional assumptions: (a) given any two distinct workers, the set of yields achievable by a firm with the first worker is disjoint from the set of yields achievable by it with the second, and (b) the contract choice problem is pair-wise efficient, we prove that there is no stable outcome at which a firm can get more than what it gets at the unique outcome of our procedure.

Suggested Citation

  • Somdeb Lahiri, 2005. "Stable Outcomes for Two-Sided Contract Choice Problems," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 323-334, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:comaot:v:10:y:2005:i:4:d:10.1007_s10588-005-6284-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10588-005-6284-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 16(2), November.
    2. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-137, March.
    3. Somdeb Lahiri, 2003. "Stable Matchings for a Generalised Marriage Problem," Working Papers 2003.117, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lahiri, Somdeb, 2007. "A weak bargaining set for contract choice problems," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 185-190, December.

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