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Coalition Formation and Stability

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  • José Alcalde
  • Antonio Romero-Medina

Abstract

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.
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Suggested Citation

  • José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina, 2006. "Coalition Formation and Stability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 365-375, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:365-375
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0123-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 135-137, March.
    2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barberà, Salvador & Beviá, Carmen & Ponsatí, Clara, 2015. "Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 237-257.
    2. Pablo Revilla, 2004. "Many-to-one Matching When Colleagues Matter," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/85, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    3. Alcalde, Jose & Revilla, Pablo, 2004. "Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 869-887, December.
    4. Karakaya, Mehmet, 2011. "Hedonic coalition formation games: A new stability notion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 157-165, May.
    5. Antonio Magaña & Francesc Carreras, 2018. "Coalition Formation and Stability," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 467-502, June.
    6. Sheida Etemadidavan & Andrew J. Collins, 2021. "An Empirical Distribution of the Number of Subsets in the Core Partitions of Hedonic Games," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-20, December.
    7. Hakan İnal, 2015. "Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(4), pages 745-763, December.
    8. Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus, 2017. "Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 435-455, May.
    9. Greg Leo & Jian Lou & Martin Van der Linden & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Matching soulmates," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 822-857, October.
    10. Suksompong, Warut, 2015. "Individual and group stability in neutral restrictions of hedonic games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1-5.
    11. José Alcalde & Pablo Revilla, 2001. "Tops Responsiveness, Strategy-Proofness And Coalition Formation Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    12. Andrew J. Collins & Sheida Etemadidavan & Wael Khallouli, 2020. "Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games using a Monte Carlo Method," Papers 2007.12127, arXiv.org.
    13. Papai, Szilvia, 2004. "Unique stability in simple coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-354, August.
    14. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Seçkin Özbilen, 2023. "Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences," Working Papers 1399, Barcelona School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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