IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/cejnor/v32y2024i3d10.1007_s10100-023-00890-0.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Altruistic preferences in global emission games

Author

Listed:
  • A. Zapata

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

  • A. M. Mármol

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

  • L. Monroy

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

  • M. A. Caraballo

    (Universidad de Sevilla)

Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of altruism on the individual country goverments’ incentives to reduce global polluting emissions. The game theory perspective provides insights into the strategic decision-making processes of the governments regarding the problem of climate change. We propose a model of strategic interactions among countries in which each government is concerned with its own benefit, as well as with the benefits of all the other countries.The model is a vector-valued non-cooperative game that permits the representation of situations in which the preferences of the governments are incomplete and there is imprecision about the degrees of altruism. The focus is on the identification of the potential equilibria that will eventually be reached when the governments show different attitudes towards other countries or groups of countries. As a result, we show that the incorporation of altruism into the model produces equilibria with a positive effect on the reduction of emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Zapata & A. M. Mármol & L. Monroy & M. A. Caraballo, 2024. "Altruistic preferences in global emission games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 32(3), pages 843-864, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:32:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10100-023-00890-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-023-00890-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10100-023-00890-0
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10100-023-00890-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Finus & Alejandro Caparrós (ed.), 2015. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345.
    2. van der Pol, Thomas & Weikard, Hans-Peter & van Ierland, Ekko, 2012. "Can altruism stabilise international climate agreements?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 112-120.
    3. Sophie Bade, 2005. "Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(2), pages 309-332, August.
    4. Marmol, Amparo M. & Puerto, Justo & Fernandez, Francisco R., 2002. "Sequential incorporation of imprecise information in multiple criteria decision processes," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 123-133, February.
    5. L. S. Shapley & Fred D. Rigby, 1959. "Equilibrium points in games with vector payoffs," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 57-61, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Juho Kokkala & Kimmo Berg & Kai Virtanen & Jirka Poropudas, 2019. "Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(2), pages 185-204, March.
    2. Mark Schopf, 2024. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(9), pages 2309-2359, September.
    3. Jaeok Park, 2019. "Decision Making and Games with Vector Outcomes," Working papers 2019rwp-146, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    4. Kuzyutin, Denis & Smirnova, Nadezhda & Gromova, Ekaterina, 2019. "Long-term implementation of the cooperative solution in a multistage multicriteria game," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 6(C).
    5. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2012. "Stable Climate Coalitions (Nash) and International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 3915, CESifo.
    6. De Magistris, Enrico, 2024. "Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 126-140.
    7. Yasuo Sasaki, 2019. "Rationalizability in multicriteria games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(2), pages 673-685, June.
    8. Hara, Kazuhiro, 2022. "Coalitional strategic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    9. Monica Milasi & Domenico Scopelliti, 2021. "A Variational Approach to the Maximization of Preferences Without Numerical Representation," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 190(3), pages 879-893, September.
    10. A. Zapata & A. M. Mármol & L. Monroy & M. A. Caraballo, 2019. "A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 415-432, April.
    11. Zachary Feinstein & Birgit Rudloff, 2021. "Characterizing and Computing the Set of Nash Equilibria via Vector Optimization," Papers 2109.14932, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
    12. Georgios Gerasimou, 2019. "Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 165-171, December.
    13. Andreas H. Hamel & Andreas Löhne, 2018. "A set optimization approach to zero-sum matrix games with multi-dimensional payoffs," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 88(3), pages 369-397, December.
    14. Sasaki, Yasuo, 2022. "Unawareness of decision criteria in multicriteria games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 31-40.
    15. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    16. Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo & Alistair Ulph, 2014. "International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion," Department of Economics Working Papers 19/14, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    17. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2020. "Public good agreements under the weakest‐link technology," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(3), pages 555-582, June.
    18. Nkuiya, Bruno, 2020. "Stability of international environmental agreements under isoelastic utility," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    19. Karl FARMER & Birgit BEDNAR-FRIEDL, 2009. "External Balance, Dynamic Efficiency, and the Welfare Costs of Unilateral Permit Policy in Interdependent Economies," EcoMod2009 21500029, EcoMod.
    20. Benjamin Jones & Michael Keen & Jon Strand, 2013. "Fiscal implications of climate change," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(1), pages 29-70, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-cooperative emission games; Altruistic preferences; Vector-valued games; Partial information; Equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:32:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s10100-023-00890-0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.