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Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools

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  • Katarína Cechlárová
  • Tamás Fleiner
  • David Manlove
  • Iain McBride
  • Eva Potpinková

Abstract

Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for assigning students to study places or fresh graduates to their first positions. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning trainee teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by the situation characteristic for Slovak and Czech education system where each pre-service teacher specializes in two subjects. We show that if the two subjects can be performed independently in two different schools, then a feasible assignment can be found efficiently by employing network flow techniques. By contrast, the requirement to perform both subjects at the same school leads to intractable problems even under several strict restrictions concerning the total number of subjects, partial capacities of schools and the number of acceptable schools each teacher is allowed to list. Finally, we report on an integer programming model for solving the ‘inseparable subjects’ case of the teachers assignment problem and the results of its application to real data. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

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  • Katarína Cechlárová & Tamás Fleiner & David Manlove & Iain McBride & Eva Potpinková, 2015. "Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(3), pages 547-562, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:23:y:2015:i:3:p:547-562
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-014-0356-5
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    1. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 368-371, May.
    2. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    3. Péter Biró & Sofya Kiselgof, 2015. "College admissions with stable score-limits," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(4), pages 727-741, December.
    4. Péter Biró & Flip Klijn, 2013. "Matching With Couples: A Multidisciplinary Survey," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(02), pages 1-18.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrej Kastrin & Janez Povh & Lidija Zadnik Stirn & Janez Žerovnik, 2021. "Methodologies and applications for resilient global development from the aspect of SDI-SOR special issues of CJOR," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 29(3), pages 773-790, September.
    2. Julien Combe & Umut Mert Dur & Olivier Tercieux & Camille Terrier & M. Utku Ünver, 2022. "Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1050, Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Botond Bertók & Tibor Csendes & Tibor Illés, 2015. "Editorial," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(4), pages 811-813, December.
    4. Elacqua, Gregory & Gómez, Leidy & Krussig, Thomas & Marotta, Luana & Méndez, Carolina & Neilson, Christopher, 2022. "The Potential of Smart Matching Platforms in Teacher Assignment: The Case of Ecuador," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 12483, Inter-American Development Bank.
    5. Tibor Csendes & Lidija Zadnik Stirn & Janez Žerovnik, 2015. "Editorial," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(3), pages 523-525, September.

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