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Elected Versus Appointed County Commission Executives: Race, Political Favors and Support Facilities

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  • Gary Hoover
  • Sondra Collins

Abstract

In this paper we explore how blacks influence expenditure and employment decisions of county commission executives. We also explore whether or not this influence varies when county commission executives are elected verses appointed to their positions. The desire to earn votes could mean that elected officials treat voting populations, including blacks, in a manner that is distinctly different from their appointed counterparts. We find that in areas where there is more discretion, elected officials tend to have higher per capita expenditures. However, there does not appear to be any difference in employment practices. We find that having a larger black population is positively related with discretionary spending and employment. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Hoover & Sondra Collins, 2013. "Elected Versus Appointed County Commission Executives: Race, Political Favors and Support Facilities," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 449-457, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:blkpoe:v:40:y:2013:i:4:p:449-457
    DOI: 10.1007/s12114-013-9164-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eisinger, Peter K., 1982. "Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black Political Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(2), pages 380-392, June.
    2. Tim Besley & Abigail Payne, 2003. "Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges," IFS Working Papers W03/11, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    3. Hanssen, F Andrew, 1999. "The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of State Judges," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 205-232, January.
    4. Mladenka, Kenneth R., 1989. "Blacks and Hispanics in Urban Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 165-191, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Government expenditures; Representative democracy; Public input; I28; I29;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • I29 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Other

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