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Endogenous queue number determination in G/M/s systems

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  • Vasco F. Alves

    (University of Birmingham)

Abstract

This paper presents a model for the endogenous determination of the number of queues in a G/M/s system. Customers arriving at a system where s customers are being served play a game, choosing between s parallel queues or one single queue. Equilibria are obtained for risk-neutral and risk-averse customers. With risk-neutral customers, both a single queue and multiple queues are equilibrium states. When risk-averse customers are considered, there is a unique single queue equilibrium. These results are discussed and suggestions for further research put forth.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasco F. Alves, 2021. "Endogenous queue number determination in G/M/s systems," 4OR, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 113-126, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:aqjoor:v:19:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10288-020-00437-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10288-020-00437-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Queues—Applications: strategic interactions; Queues—Multichannel: determining number; Games/group decisions: strategic queueing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines

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