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Tiebout sorting in online communities

Author

Listed:
  • John Lynham

    (University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa)

  • Philip R. Neary

    (Royal Holloway, University of London)

Abstract

This paper proposes a stylized, dynamic model to address the issue of sorting online. There are two large homogeneous groups of individuals. Everyone must choose between two online platforms, one of which has superior amenities (akin to having superior local public goods). Each individual enjoys interacting online with those from their own group but dislikes being on the same platform as those in the other group. Unlike a Tiebout model of residential sorting, both platforms have unlimited capacity so there are no constraints on cross-platform migration. It is clear how each group would like to sort themselves but, in the presence of the other type, only the two segregated outcomes are guaranteed to be equilibria. Integration on a platform can be supported in equilibrium as long as the platform is sufficiently desirable. If online integration of the two communities is a desired social outcome, then the optimal policy is clear: make the preferred platform even more desirable. Revitalizing the inferior platform will never lead to integration and even increases the likelihood of segregation. Finally, integration is more elastic in response to an increase in platform amenities than to reductions in intolerance.

Suggested Citation

  • John Lynham & Philip R. Neary, 2024. "Tiebout sorting in online communities," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 73(3), pages 1149-1174, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:anresc:v:73:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00168-024-01293-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s00168-024-01293-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C73; J15; L86;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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