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Unemployment compensation and labor migration in search equilibrium model

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  • Chuhwan Park

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  • Chuhwan Park, 2009. "Unemployment compensation and labor migration in search equilibrium model," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1095-1109, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:anresc:v:43:y:2009:i:4:p:1095-1109
    DOI: 10.1007/s00168-008-0244-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Davidson, Carl & Woodbury, Stephen A., 1997. "Optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 359-387, June.
    2. Shavell, Steven & Weiss, Laurence, 1979. "The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1347-1362, December.
    3. Flemming, J. S., 1978. "Aspects of optimal unemployment insurance : Search, leisure, savings and capital market imperfections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 403-425, December.
    4. Pissarides, C A, 1984. "Efficient Job Rejection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 97-108, Supplemen.
    5. Baily, Martin Neil, 1978. "Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 379-402, December.
    6. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Short-run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unemployment Vacancies, and Real Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 676-690, September.
    7. Peter A. Diamond, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(2), pages 217-227.
    8. Harris, John R & Todaro, Michael P, 1970. "Migration, Unemployment & Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 126-142, March.
    9. Christopher A. Pissarides, 1987. "Search, Wage Bargains and Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(3), pages 473-483.
    10. Ortega, Javier, 2000. "Pareto-Improving Immigration in an Economy with Equilibrium Unemployment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 92-112, January.
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