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Analysis of Core Stakeholder Behaviour in the Tourism Community Using Economic Game Theory

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  • Zhenzhi Yang

    (Tourism School, Sichuan University, No 29 Wangjiang Road, Chengdu, Sichuan 610064, China)

  • Hong Shi

    (China Leisure and Tourism Center, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China)

  • Dan Yang

    (Tourism School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China, and School of Foreign Languages, China West Normal University, Nanchong, China)

  • Xuanyu Ren

    (Tourism School, Sichuan University, Chengdu, China)

  • Yinchun Cai

    (School of Humanities and Social Science, Panzhihua University, Panzhihua, China)

Abstract

In a Nash equilibrium, every participant's strategy is the optimal reaction to the strategies of others. Based on economic theory, this paper analyses core stakeholders' behaviour in the tourism community at Qingcheng Mountain, Chengdu, China. Taking taxation, land prices and employment as the payoffs, and the local government, the community and the investors as the players, the incomplete information static game model is applied to outline the stakeholders' behaviour. The paper also examines who benefits the most and who occupies a dominant position. The results indicate that the game strategy of residents in Qingcheng Mountain is influenced by the investors. The influence of the investors is also crucial in the decision making mechanism of the tourism community to maintain sustainable tourism development.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhenzhi Yang & Hong Shi & Dan Yang & Xuanyu Ren & Yinchun Cai, 2015. "Analysis of Core Stakeholder Behaviour in the Tourism Community Using Economic Game Theory," Tourism Economics, , vol. 21(6), pages 1169-1187, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:toueco:v:21:y:2015:i:6:p:1169-1187
    DOI: 10.5367/te.2015.0521
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Duglio & Alessandro Bonadonna & Marilisa Letey & Giovanni Peira & Laura Zavattaro & Giampiero Lombardi, 2019. "Tourism Development in Inner Mountain Areas—The Local Stakeholders’ Point of View through a Mixed Method Approach," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-19, October.
    2. Francis Onditi & Claire Amuhaya, 2023. "Gaming Borderless Internationalism: From International to Interlocalized System Using Ujamaa Epistemology," International Studies, , vol. 60(4), pages 431-443, October.
    3. Pang Qingyun & Zhang Mu, 2021. "Evolutionary game analysis of land income distribution in tourism development," Tourism Economics, , vol. 27(4), pages 670-687, June.
    4. Jinyu Pan & Zhenzhi Yang, 2023. "Knowledge mapping of relative deprivation theory and its applicability in tourism research," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, December.
    5. Yong Sun & Yalin Wang & Baoyin Liu & Zhongrui Sun, 2023. "Evolutionary game of destination brand co‐construction with government involvement," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 2125-2136, June.
    6. Tsaur, Ruey-Chyn & Chen, Chyoug-Hwa, 2018. "Strategies for cross-border travel supply chains: Gaming chinese group tours to Taiwan," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 154-169.
    7. Alessandro Bonadonna & Chiara Giachino & Elisa Truant, 2017. "Sustainability and Mountain Tourism: The Millennial’s Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(7), pages 1-15, July.
    8. Kai Wang & Chang Gan & Yan Ou & Haolong Liu, 2019. "Low-Carbon Behaviour Performance of Scenic Spots in a World Heritage Site," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(13), pages 1-23, July.

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