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La confiance : un mode de coordination dont l'utilisation dépend de ses conditions de production

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  • Vincent Mangematin

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, MTS - Management Technologique et Strategique - EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management)

Abstract

La diversité des arrangements contractuels (alliances, accords de coopération) et l'émergence d'une réflexion sur les modes de coordination au sein des réseaux ont créé les conditions favorables à un retour théorique sur la notion de confiance. Pourtant, ce concept n'est pas nouveau et il est déjà intensément utilisé en économie. Arrow [1974] place la confiance au coeur des institutions invisibles, avec les principes éthiques et moraux. Si Arrow mentionne que la confiance peut être parfois difficile à établir, les ressources mobilisées pour sa construction restent hors du champ économique. La confiance est en fait considérée comme immanente. Ce chapitre tente de répondre à certaines questions récurrentes : A quoi sert la confiance dans la coordination des actions entre acteurs ? Peut-on la produire, la gérer ? Est-elle un mode de coordination efficace ? Dans quelles circonstances ?

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  • Vincent Mangematin, 1998. "La confiance : un mode de coordination dont l'utilisation dépend de ses conditions de production," Post-Print hal-00424495, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00424495
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.grenoble-em.com/hal-00424495
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    2. Vincent Mangematin, 1997. "The Simultaneous Shaping of Organization and Technology Within Co-operative Agreements," Post-Print hal-00424311, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. KASMAOUI, Kamal & ERRAMI, Youssef, 2017. "Social Cohesion, Institutions and Public Policies: New Evidence from the MENA region," MPRA Paper 80950, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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